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Reviewed by Blake T. Ostler

Recently. Mellen Press publi shed a book by Francis J .
Beckw ith and Stephe n E. Parrish ent it led The Mormon Concept of
God: A Philosophical Analysis. The authors cl aim that their book
is the fi rst and on ly phi losoph ical cri tiq ue by no n-Mormons o f
the un ique Mormon concept of God . They are, however, nearl y a
century too lale to legit imate ly claim this august d istinction. The
hono r goes to the Reverend Vander Da nekt. who ably critiq ued
the Mo rmon concept of God in his debate with 8 . H. Ro berts, '
Beckw ith and Parrish's work, however, makes several new claims
that arc worthy of response.
Beckwith and Parrish's work is d ivided in to fi ve separate sections. The fi rst section ou tli nes "the classical concept of God ."
The second purpons to define "Mormon Finitistic The ism." The
th ird presents an argument against Mormon cos mo logy based
upo n the supposed impossibi lity of an aclual infi nite. The fourth
sect ion c rit iques the argumen t of David L. Pau lsen, professor of
phil os'o phy at Bri gham Young Uni versity. that the te leolog ical argument belfer supports the Mormon view of a God who is in some
respect s cond itioned, tha n the abso lute of classical theo logy. T he
last sect ion argues that the classical concept of God accounts fo r
the biblical data belfer than does the Mormon concept they have
outlin ed.
Unfort unatel y, the autho rs ' attempt to d iscuss both the elassica l concept of God and Mormon views suffe rs fro m vagueness.
The concept of God promu lgated by Thomas Aqui nas, fo r
example. whic h is usuall y associated with a dom inant view in
scholastic theo logy , is very di ffe rent from that e lucidated by later
Vander Donekl. in B. H. Roberts. Morm on Doc/rille of Deity (Salt Lake
City: T he Deserct News. 19U3).
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theologians Lu is de Molina and Suarez. Arguments of process
theologians have been just ly criticized for faili ng to recognize the
d isti nction between whal we may call "absolute sovere ignty"
theo log ians and "limited sovereig nty" theologians. The absolute
sovereignty theolog ians like August ine, Aqui nas, Calvin, and
Luther emphasize God 's power and know ledge at the expense of
free wi ll, while limited sovereignty theolog ians like Lui s de
Moli na, James Armini us, and Alvin Plantinga emphasize human
free wi ll at the expense of God's power. The aut hors constant ly
equivocate between these IwO major views. As a result, their
analys is is confusi ng and misses many subtle di stinction s whic h
ough t to be observed. Indeed, these d istinclions are precisely th e
ones required in order to make sense of the Mormon positiol1. 2

1. God 's Pe rfection
The a u thor~ begin by contrasting their view of the Mormon
concept of God with the God of "class ical thei sm." The re is a
very basic difference between the Mormon view of perfection a nd
the "classical" view. The "classical" trad ition views perfection as
static and absolute, an upper lim it beyond which it is imposs ible to
progress. Fro m thi s view of perfect ion it follows that God is without any part s (metaphys ically simp le), outside of time (timeless),
absolute ly unchanging in any respect (immutab le), un touched by
anyth ing that occu rs in the world (impassab le), and withou t any
material body (incorporeal). However, in Mormoni sm, perfection
2
It also bears floting that many of the argumerHs that they offer __ gainst
__ particular "Mormon" concept of God are basically a reh,lsh of .lrguments presented against process thought in Process Theology. ed. Ronald Nash (Gmnd
Rapids: Baker Book House. 1987), Process theology. very brieny. views God as
a d ynamic, self-surpassing being rather than a static absolute. The authors' arguments against the Mormon view of a universe without temporal beginning arc
merely w:lfmed·ovcr versions of arguments prcscntcd in Willi am Lane Craig's
"Creation ex nihilo" in that collection (ibid" 145- 73), ,lhhough Craig'S presentation is much more lucid. The argument attempting to show the comp;uibility of
foreknowledge and free wil l is merely a poor revision of Craig's " Divinc Foreknowledge and Future Contingents" found in the same work (ibid .. 95- (15), The
authors h.we simply tailored such arguments to particular Mormon beliefs. What
is interesting is that process thought and Mormonism are so similar in some
respects that arguments again. t one often turn oul to be ;lrgumenl~ against the
other.

BECKWlTII. PARR ISH, CONCEPT OF GOD (OSTLER)

101

is a dynamic notion that includes interpersonal involvement with
an ever-c hang ing world, At any given moment, God 3 is the greatest possible being, but is se lf-surpass ing in each new moment of
reality. Whereas the classical God is the creator and sustainer of
the world ex nihifo (or out of nothing), the Mormon God organizes a chaos of eternally exist ing mass and energy into a cosmos
of order.
The au thors argue that criticisms of the class ical concepts of
perfection by Mormon authors are not successfu l. One such argumen t that Beckwith and Parri sh wrestle with is whether God is
absolutely self-sufficient. Mormons have indeed argued that a
God who is absolutely a se (or self-sufficient), in the sense that
God logically cannot depend on anything else for any of his
intrinsic or real properties, rai ses certain problems,
In particular, Aristotle observed that God, conceived as the
Unmoved Mover, would co ntemplate only his self-perfection, because to co ntemplate anyt hing less wou ld be an imperfection.
Such a view may be fine for Greek metaphysics. but it will hardl y
do for the Christ ian notion that God is love- unless this scriptural
assertion is interpreted to mean that God is narcissistic self-love
rather than ot her- loving. Further, if God is perfect and needs
noth ing, what po.ssible reason could he have for creati ng a lessthan-perfect world ? He certai nl y does n't need our praise (m uch
less ou r blasphemy) and the creation of such a world adds nothing
to God's perfection. In pri nciple. a purel y act ual God who has
accompl ished everything possible could not have anythin g left to
accomplish. Because the class ical God IS simply the apex of all
va lue poss ible, any creation could onl y dimini sh the overall value
of the ex isting universe .
I presented a ded uctive argumen t in an article ent itled " Th e
Mormon Concept of God," which co ncluded that if God possesses aseity ill lllis sense, then in principle there can nol be any
sufficient reason for God to create a nythi ng. 4 The au th ors
3 UI1 !c~S spcaking of thc individual llnd scpnralc d ivinc persons, I will
use lhe lerm God 10 refer 10 the Falher, Son, and lIo ly GhOSl united:ls one God or
"Godhead,"
4
III Blake T. O~tler. 'T he Mormon Concept of God," Di(lioglle 17/2
( 1984): 90, More perspicuously. the argument is thaI lhe tack of any suffic ient
reason f',\'If'rlltl/IO GOlI ror God to create anything llnd nny reason iJl/cmai 10 God
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respond that I have mi sunderstood the notion of self-sufficiency
on which the argument rests. They claim that the " te rm selfsufficient, when describing the classical God, simply mean s that
God is not depende nt on anyth ing elseJor his being God . . .. It
follows onl y that God cannot perform an act which fulfill s a lack
in his nature (prec isely because he lacks nothing), not that He
cannot perform any act for which He has suffic ient reason to
perform " (p. 9, e mphas is added ).
However, I believe that it is the authors who mi sunderstand th e
notion of asc ity. For Thomi sts and other medieval theolog ians,
self- sufficiency means mu ch more than merely that God' s sta tus
as God does not depend on an ything . Indeed , Ihe very nOli on of
an actus pllms upon which Aqui nas premi sed his entire theo logy
entai ls Ihat God cannot be re lated to or depend upo n anything for
(lilY intrinsic property.5 The re is no potentialit y in God to be other
than what he j ust timelessly is. God would be exactly the same in
all respects even if the world never ex isted. He would be just as
happy, j ust as perfect, ju st as pleased if the e ntire world never existed--or even if it ex isted but every person created e ngaged in
murder and rape throu ghout thei r li ves. Since nothing acts up o n
God on this view, God' s being in all respects is exactly the same
whether the world ex ists or not. It fo ll ows thOlI there is no positi ve
reason for God to create such a world since it literall y makes n o
difference to him-or it.

would result ill a cenaill necessi t)' of natu re which renders God unfree as to
whether to creme. The argume nt I presented is as follow~:
I . If God possesses aseit)' and exists, th en he is not dependent on 'In),thing nor lackin g in an)' concciv(lble manncr (i.e .. God is self-sufficient).
2. A self-su fficient being C(lnnot manifest (l need nor he enhanced b )'
an)' ac tion (from I).
3. Ever)' positive action rcquires;1I1 explanation sufficient to :!ccount
for ;t (criteri:! of sufficient reason).
4. Creati on of the cosmos is a positive action.
5. A self·sufficient being could not manifest a re:Json suflicient to
e~pl:Jin why it preferred e~istenee or the cosmos to its nonexistence ( I, 2).
6. Hence. God did not creale the cosmos (3 . 4. 5).
SI. Thoma~ A(tuin:ls. C(){/ olld the Oilier vj Crl'atioll. vol. I \If flllsi c
Writings vj St. T!tomas Aquillos. ed. Anton C. ]legis (Ncw York: R:Jndom House.
1945). 26.

,
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The authors fail to understand the difference between their
view and the Thomist view of God. They have assumed a single
"classical" concept of God identical to the evangelical view they
present, and that certainly is not the case. For example, the au thors
implicitly reject the Th omist view of aseily. In stead, they accept
the view that some of God's intrinsic properties are dependent
upon what humans do. since they assert that God's "re lat iona l
knowledge" i ~ different dependin g on what h;:appens in the world.
Moreover. they assert that what we do matters to God (p. 17). Presumab ly, according to this view God has a good reason to create,
i.e., it makes him happier and it matters to him that we ex ist. But
then. God depend!>' on the world for hi s knowledge and internal
emotions. Thus thi s God is rlOI se lf-suffi cient in his intrinsic being. Their view is therefore more moderate than the Thomis! view
that I criticized. I would concede that my criticism does not apply
to the concept of God fashioned by the authors. However, this
concession docs not diminish the force of the argument against
the Thomist view of God.
The authors face problems of internal consistency at Ihi s point
because they adopt the Thomisl argument that, in all respects.
"God is the best. always has been the best, and always wi ll be the
best" (p. 14). Aside from the fact that best is a term of compari son and God can' t be com pared to anything according to their
view, I think the aut hors would have to admit thai God is beller or
happier as a result of creation. He is happier if we accept him than
if we reject him. He may not be any more or any less God, but he
is in some respeci better if the world exists. Thus God is dept!nden t on the world for al least some of his intrinsic properties (i.e.,
his emotiona l response and know ledge of which possible things
are actual) and can be better depending on how cont ingent Ihings
turn out which are not fully up to him.

2. God's Power
The au thors go on to argue that the classical God is unlimited
power, whereas the Mormon God has "limited po we r"
(pp. 10- 11, 40-41). Describing the Mormon deity as merely
"ltmited in power" is clearly inadequate because it fails to dist in guish God from ot her things li mited in powe r such as humans and

In
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ants. Rather, the Mormon deity sho uld be desc ribed as havi ng
" maximal powe r," that is, all the power it is (consistently) poss ible for one being to have among other free be ings. The difference
between class ical and Mormon views is not that God has a ll powe r
possible; rather, the difference lies in what limi ts God 's power.
The authors assume that God is not limited by an y nonlogical
conditions, whereas the Mormon deity must conte nd with un c reated matter and intell igences . They argue that the Mormon G od
has less po wer than is poss ible and thus is not really a ll -po werful.
However, they fail to prov ide a consistent noti on of o mnipo te nce
agai nst whic h the Mormon claim can be compared.
The auth ors argue th at God ca n do anything, p rov ided that ( I)
do ing it is logicall y possib le and (2) do ing it is consistent with
God 's basic att ributes . However, even the autho rs cannot cons i s ~
te ntl y adopt th is notion o f omnipotence. For exampl e. God ca/l n o ! bring about my free acts, a lthou gh the fac t that I bri ng about
my free acts is ( I) log ica ll y possib le and (2) consisten t with God 's
att ributes. Thus the auth ors' notio n o f o mni potence is not adequat e .
Problematically, Beckwit h and Parri sh also acce pt the view that
God has middl e kn owled ge o r know ledge not o nl y of what will
happen, but al so what would happen in any possible ci rcu mstance
even if that c ircumstance never occurs (p. 16) . It is well established that midd le knowledge entail s th at God is li mited by co ntingent states of affairs that he can not fu ll y contro l. Thus if it is
true that if Socrates were created ill circumstances of the actua l
world, then Socrates will freely d rink hemlock to en d his life, the n
it fo llows that God cannot bri ng about the contingent state o f affairs of Socrates' existillg ill the actua l world, but Socrates f reely
ref rain s f rom drill king hemlock. Si nce e very free act open to hu·
mans enta ils a contin gent state of affairs which Go d cannot brin g
abou t, it fo ll ows that God is rather severely lim ited by mere possibilities. It thus seems ironi c for th e auth ors to c hide Morm o ni s m
fo r li m iting God 's powe r by eternal actualiti es whe n Ihey must
limit God 's power by mere poss ibi lities.
Indeed, g iven God 's middle kn ow ledge, God is subject to a
kind of " fate," as Jonathan Edwards po inted o ut lo ng ago . S ince
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God has no control over which "counterfactuals of freed o rn"6
are true, it follows that God isn' t full y in charge of things, Sovereignty and power are necessarily shared among man y agents and
hcnce God 's own sovercignty and power arc limited by the acts of
othcr free agcnts whom God cannot control. Although Mormo nism has long held that power is necessarily sharcd, such a view is
objectionab le to the authors since they demand a God with more
co ntrol and more power because they believe that God is limited
onl y by logic and not by eternall y coexisting realities. Yet to be
consistent they must limit God 's power in this way.
Neve rtheless. the authors could have argued that the actualization of such "countcrfactuals of freedom" is merely the result o f
God's dec ision to create free beings out of nothing . God could
have the power they describe if he had decided to refra in fro m
creating free beings . Thus they may clai m that God has more
po wer in their view lhan the Mormon deity. who is necessaril y
limited by other free beings. bccause in their view God is onl y
contingent ly limited by his own dec isions.
However. this argume nt is not successfu l because it fai ls to
consider the logic of God as a being ex isti ng in an aclual world .
For example, it scems clear that God cannot /l OW bring it about
that Lincoln is not shot in 1865, though no doubt at one time God
could have prcve nted it from occurri ng. Th us what has been actual limit s God's power. It see ms rath er academic to argue that
God can do anything logicall y possib le since God is /l O W faced
with a world containing free creatures who li mit his options. Fu rther, suppose that the world just happens to have always ex isted of
fact ual necess ity. Since God cannOl change the past. il follows Ihat
God could not change thi s eternally past fact abOllt the world.
Thus il is logicall y possib le that God is li miled by the faci thai the
world has always ex isted. But if that is true, then il is logically possible that God is conditioned by preexisti ng actualiti es eve n if God
has maximal powe r-or all th e power it is consistently possible to
6 A counlerfaetual of freedom is a proposition whie h descri bes wh::lt ::l
person wou ld frcely do if placed in any partic ul ar circu mstances. A good deal of
doubt has been expressed as to the c)(istc nce of any truc countcrfaclUals of frec·
dom. Though if there are no such true counterf::lctuals God cannot kn ow the m.
!)(Iee Beckwith and Parrish. See Will iam lIasker, God, Time alld Knowledge
( Ithaca. N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989), eh. 2.
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have given whaf has obtained in the past. In any case, Ille ,wlhors
fai l to address these other conditions on divine power which have
been well documented in the literature of the phil osophy of relig ion. 7 Given these limitations, the Mormon view of God's maximal power is logically consistent and the authors' vicw is not.

3. God's Knowledge
The authors then move on to define God's omn isc ience as

knowledge of all true proposi tions, inc luding propositions about
future free acts of humans (called by philosophers "fu lU rc co ntingent pro positions"). They contrast th is vicw with the notion
held by some Mormons that God does not know future free acts.
However, Beckw ith and Parrish mislead reade rs when they argue
that the view that God docs not know future free acts (or "future
contingent propositions") is somehow th e Mormon view and their
view is the biblica l view accepted by righ I-t hinking evangelicals
(p. 127 n, 22). An increasing number o f Ch ristian the ists in both
the Catholi c and Protestant camps accept an "open" view of
God- the view that God changes in response to the world and that
the futu re is an open realm of as yet undecided possibilities. 8
7
See for example, George I. M:lVTodes, "Defining Omnipotence:'
Phiiosol'hiclIl Siudies 32 ( 1977) : 191 - 202; Thomas P. Flint and Alfred
Freddoso. "Maximal Power." in E.lislence anti Ihe Nature (if God. ed. Alfred
Freddoso (Notre Dame: Not re D ~me Press. 1983). 81-113; Edward R. Wierenga.
The Nature oiGod ( Ithaca: Cornell University Pres~, 1989), 28- 29. God's temporally indexed. maximal pOwcr cnn be defined ~s follows: An ngent A is maxi·
mally powerful at a lime I if A is able unilaterally to bring ubout any state of
affairs SA such that: (a) SA does not entai l that '·A docs not bring about SA at 1'.:
and (b) SA is compossiblc with all events that precede t in time in the aclual
world up to I.
S Modern philosophers who believe that God's knowledge of future frcc
acts is open include Richard Swinburne, Tile Coilerellce of Theism (Oxford:
Clarendon. 1977). 172- 78; A. N. Prior, "The Formalities of Omniscience,"
Phili sopliy 37 (1962): 114-29: Peter Geach. Providence lind EI,i/ (Cambridge:
C:lmbridge University Press, 1977); '-lasker, God. Time (D!d Kn owletlge; Charles
Hartshorne, Tire Dil'ine RelativilY (Ncw Haven: Yale Univc rsi ty Press. 1948); J .
R. Lucas, The Freedom o/the Will (Oxfo rd: Oxford University Press. 1970). and
J . R. Lucas, "Forek nowledge ~nd the Vulnerability of Goo" in The Philosophy ill
Christianity, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1989), 119- 28; Rkhard Rice, God's J'-orekllowledge wuJ Mall·S i'rWJ Will
(M inneapolis: Bethany House, 1985), and Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice. John
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Recenll y, five moderate evangelical s aUl hored a book wherein
Ihey argue that the view (held by Beckwith and Parri sh) that God
is time less, immutab le, and has abso lute foreknowledge worships
Neoplatonism rather than the biblica l God. 9

Mormonism, Free Will, and Foreknowledge
The hi storica l tension between foreknowledge and free will is
not an issue of Mormon theism vs. evangelical theism as Beckwith
and Parrish paint it ; rather, it is an issue confro nting theists generall y. James Faulconer comes as close as anyone to making an accu rate stateme nt of Ihe Mormon posi tion regarding God's fo reknowledge:
Hi storically. most Latte r-day Sai nts have taken the
first gene ral pos ition: everythin g is foreseen and freedom remains. Some have taken the second, that God's
foreknowledge is not absolute. The third alternati ve,
that human freedom is illusory, is incompatible with
LOS belief in genuine fre e agency and responsibilit y.IO
Thu s it remains an open question in Mormonism whether
fore know ledge and free agency are compatibl e. I I I have argued
Ihat they are not compatible. The Mormon view that God IS
in volved in "ete rnal progression" and that a genuine risk is

Sanders. William Hasker, and David Basinge r in their contri butions in The
Ollelll!eJs of GOll: A lJiblicol Challenge to the Traditiofl(l/ Undersumding of God
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1994).
9
Pi nnock et al.. The OpenneSJ of GOll.
10 James E. faulconer. "Foreknowledge of God." in Encyclopedia of
Mormonism. cd. Daniel H. Ludlow, 4 'lois. (New York: Macmillan. 1992).
2:521-22.
II However. il is the position of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints that the propositions ''There will lat some timel be nothing more to be
learned (by God]"' and that "the Father and the Son do not progress in knowledge
and wisdom because they already know aillhings past, present and to come" afC
'false doctrine .'" The First Presidency under Brigham Young declared Ihese
propositions false in " First Presidency statement printed in the Millennial Star
27 (21 October 1865): 660; and Messages 0/ the "'irst Presidency, cd. James R.
Chlrk. 6 'lois. (Salt Lake City: Bookeraft. 1965- 75),2:234.
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associated with sal vati on due to free will (in opposition to Satan 's
plan, which would have removed all risks) is more consistent with
the open vicw of God. The strong comm itment to free agency in
Mormon tho ught is of course basic becau se it is grounded in
Lehi 's stalement in the Boo k of Mormon that "it must needs be
that the re is an opposit ion in all thin gs" (2 Neph i 2: I I). But vIews
about the inco mpatibility of such free agency and God' s forekn owledge shou ld not be labeled "the Mormon view,"

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Foreknowledge
The authors unsuccessfully attempt to defend the ir view
again st the argu men t that if God infallibly foreknow!; the future,
thcn human s cannot be free . They present a supposed argument
purporting to show that foreknowl edge is incompatible with free
wi ll and then they easily and decis ively de feat it (pp. 12_ 13).12
Now, I am quite sati sfied that the authors have shown that the argument Ihat they presellt is simply (a nd obvious ly) inva lid. Th e
argument as presented commit s the obv iou s moda l fallacy Ihat "if
x wi ll definitely occur, then x will occur necess aril y."13 However,
no o ne to my knowledge has ever presented the flawed a rgume nt
which they all ege represe nts the argument given by "so me Mo rmon th inkers." What is worse, they appear to attribute thi s badly
fl awed argument to me (pp. 12- 13) ! But I have never presented
such an argument and I do not relish having suc h a ridicu lous argument att ri buted to me. The argumen t they present thus re prese nts a straw man. 14
12
follows:
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The (bad ly) flawed argument presented by Beckwith ~nd Parri sh is as

God's knowledge of the future is always troe.
The refore, God knows what will definitely happen.
' Pat will mow the law on Tuesday' is part of this definite future.
Free will is the ability to do o therwise.
Therefore. 'Pat will mow his law o n Tuesday' could not be otherwise.
Therefore, Gml's omniscience eliminates human free will"' (p. 12).
13 More accura tel y, this argument commits the fallacy of inferrin g the necessity of the consequent from the necessity of [he consequence: :llso known as
Sleigh's Fallacy.
14 It is amazing tha t the authors are ignorant of the logical structure of the
incompatibility argument because it is probably Ihe most di scussed issue in the
philosophy of religion in the past thin y ye:lrs. Literally hundreds of articles and
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The mode rn argu me nt showi ng that free will is not compatible
wit h forek nowledge is based on the fi xity of the past or, in other
words, the principle that no person can have power to do anything
which ent ails th at God has not always believed what God has in
fnct always believed. Suppose that God has always be lieved that I
will rob a 7-Eleven at a certain time t. My refraining from rob bi ng the 7-Eleven at time t certainly entails that God has not always believed that I will rob at t. Because God has always believed
that I wi ll rob the 7- Eleven at t, I cannot have the power to refrain
from rObb in g, since this power would entail power to c hange
God's past be liefs. 1\'0 person has the power to alter the past. Yet
to be free with respect to whether ' rob, I must have power to refrain from robbing the 7- Ele ven at t. It follows that either God
does not have foreknow ledge or I am not free. IS

books have been published clarifying the logical structure of the argumen t. Sec
John M. Fischcr. cd. God. Foreknow/edge (/lid Freedom (Stanford: Stanford Unive rsity Press. 1989); Nelson Pike. "A Latter-day Look at the Foreknowledge
Problem."' Illtemotional JOllmul fo r Philosophy of Religioll 33 (1993): 129-64;
John M. Fischer. "Reeent Work on G<x1 and Freedom," AlllcriCl/Iz Philosophical
Qluzrlerly 29/2 (A pril 1992): 91 -109.
15 The val id. and I believe sound. argumenl to show thm forek now ledge is
incompatible with free wi ll is as follows:
I. It has always becn true that I will sin tomorrow. (Assumption: O mnitem porality of Trulh).
2. It is impossible that God should hold a false belief or fail to know any
truth (Assumption: Infallible Forcknowledge).
3. God hns nlways belieyed lhat I will sin tomorrow (from I and 2).
4 . ]rGod has always believed a certain thing. then il is not in anyone's
!'Ower to do ,IllY thing which en{ails that God has not always believed that thing
(Assumption: Fixed Past).
5 . It is not in my power to do anything that entails that God has not al ways believed that I will sin tomorrow (from 3 nnd 4).
6. Thnl [ refrain from sinning tOmorrow entails that God has not always
believed that I will sin tomorrow (necessary truth and from 2; Principle of Transfer of Powerlessness).
7. Thercfore. it is nOl in my power 10 refrain from sinning to morrow
(from Sand 6).
8. If I act freely when I sin tomorrow. then I also have it within my power
10 refrain from sinning (ass umption libcrlnrian free will).
9. '111ereforc, 1 do nOl aCI freely when 1 sin lomorrow (from 7 and 8).
For an Mgume!l1 usi[lg a similar logical slrueture. see Hasker. GOll. Time will
KlZvw/e(/Rf'.66--{,9.
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Nothing the authors say responds 10 this valid argument. Since
they do not consider thi s argument, they have nol successfull y
defended the "classical" view of God against thi s objeclion . 16

Ar e Scriptures In compatibl e with the O pen View?
The authors also argue that the scriptures arc incompat ible
with the view that God docs not infa llibly fo reknow all free ac ts of
humans (pp. 119- 20) . Citing Deutero nomy 18:22, the authors
argue that if any prediction made by a proph et could possib ly not
come to pass, then " in some possible world Yahweh docs nol
speak fo r Yahweh. Hence on ly i f God has abso lute foreknow ledge
of the Future docs Deuteronomy 18:22 make se nse ."]7 This
argument fail s both logica lly and in terms of biblical exeges is. As
Richard Rice noted of a similar argument presented by Beckwith:
Beckwit h ignores the tex ture and complex ity of bibl ical
prophecy. He says nothing about condi tional prophecy, and hi s rigid standa rd of prophet ic au thentic ity
would clearly disc redit Jonah, in view of the unfu lfill ed
predictions he made. IS
How then do those who be lieve God's forekn owled ge is limited explain biblical prophecy and fait h in God 's certain triumph
over evi l? God can ensure triumph over evil though the future is
not abso lute ly foreknown because he is li ke a maste r chess playe r.
16 In addition. the authors adopt :I view of God's kn owledge whic h they
cannot consistentl y asse rt. If God knows a ll true propositions about the infi ni te
future, then Goo has knowledge of a completed and actual infini te. Howcvcr.
Beckwith and P<lrrish assert th<lt it is logically im possible either for <In ac tual
infini te to exist or to complete an OIelual infi nite (ch. 3). It follows thOlt thcir
vicw of God's foreknowledge is inconsistent with their vicw th at an actual infi nite is logically impossible. This position is persuasively argued by William
FI::lnhead. "The Symmetry of the Past and the Future in the Ku /mll Cm"/IlOlog i ca/
Argulllelll." and Robert Prevos t. "Classical Theism and th e Ka/uI/I Principle,"
both in The Logic 0/ Rat;O/wl Th eism: Expllmmory EsslI),s. cd. William L1ne
Craig :lnd Mark S. Mc Leod ( Lewiston: Mellen. 1990).99-111. 113-25.
17 Deuteronomy 18:22 reads: "When a prophet speakcth in the name of
the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to pass, tlmt is the thi ng which the
Lord hath nOl spoken . but the prophet hath spoken it presumptuously."
18 Richard Ri ce, "Biblical Support for a Ncw Perspcct ivc:' in Pinnock Ct
a l.. The Opellness o/Gud, 18! n.76.
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Even though he does not know exactly which moves fre e persons
wi ll make, he knows all poss ible moves that can be made and that
he can meet any such moves and eventually win the game. God
may lose some pieces during the games, just as some person s may
free ly choose to reject God and thwart hi s plans so far as they are
concerned individua ll y, but God can guarantee ult imate victory.
Those who reject infalli ble foreknowledge affir m these propositions about God's knowledge of all possibi lities:
I . God is omn iscient in the sense that he knows all that can
be known , but it is logically impossibl e to know future acts that
are free .
2 . God knows all poss ibilities, incl uding the present prob ab ili ty of any future event.
3 . God knows now what his pu rposes are and that he will
achieve them.
4. God does not know now, in every case. prec isely which
contin gent possibility will be chosen or become actual.
5 . God knows now how he will respond to whichever cont ingell! poss ibi lity occurs to ensure the realization of his purposes .
Thus God can ensure ultimate victory and the real ization of all
of his purposes not bec ause of his omn isc ience. but because of hi s
almight y power. These feat ures of God 's knowledge ensure thaI
God knows all possibil ities and fu ture events which are now certa in gi ven causal impl ications (proposit ions I and 2) . This view
al so allows for free cho ices among genui nely open alternat ives
(propositions 2 and 4) . These provisions suggest that God knows
all poss ible avenues of cho ices (propositions 2 and 5) and , coupled with God's max imal power, enta il that God 's plans and declarat ions of fu ture events will be reali zed (proposition s 3 and 5).
Thus a com plete picture of God' s prov idence is possible even
th ough God does not have infa ll ible and complete forek now ledge .
Nevertheless, can li mited foreknow ledge be squared with
scriptura l predi ctions of the fut ure? I will argue lh al: (a) scripture
is consistent with lim ited foreknowl edge, and (b) a number of
scriptures require limi ted foreknowledge. There are several different types of prophecy, each of wh ich is con sistent with God 's limited foreknowledge:
I . Prediclio ll .~ a bollf IVhat God will bring abo ut thro ugh his
Dill/! pOlVer regardles.s of hlll1lall deciJioll s. God can clcarl y predict
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hi s own actions and promi ses regardless of human dec isions. If
human cooperation is not involved, then God c an unilaterall y
guarantee the occurrence of a pani cular event and predict it ahead
of lime. For example, God can guarantee that his plan will be ful filled because he will intervene to bring it about. Thu s God can
show prophets a panoramic vis ion of his plan fro m beginning to
end. God can declare that he knows the beginning from the end in
terms of his plan and what he will bring about himse lf:
"Declarin g the end from the begi nning. and from ancient times
the things thaI are not yet done, sayin g, My counsel shall stand,
and I will do my pleasure: ... yea, I have spoken it , I will al so
bring it to pass ; J have purposed it, I will al so do it" (I saiah
46: 10- 11). A perfect example of a scriptural passage showing that
God knows the future in virtue of what he will brin g abo ul
through his power is found in 1 Nephi 9:6: "B ut the Lord
knoweth all things from the beg inning; wherefore, he prepareth a
way to accomp li sh all hi s works among the c hildre n of men; fo r
behold, he hath all power unto the fulfilling of hi s wo rds."
Ho wever, the fact that God 's plan will be carried out does not
mean that he has to know each individual 's free actions befo re ~
hand. God has prepared a plan to save all persons if they will keep
his commandments. Ho wever, not a ll persons wil l be saved, despite
hi s plan, because they are free to reject him. God's plan wi ll be
realized , but it is poss ible that not every person will be finally ex alted. God 's plan thu s in volves a ri sk that not all persons will be
saved. There is a clear conti ngency 111 God's know ledge with respect to the future free acts of individuals. From the Mormon perspecti ve, one of the primary purposes of life was that God wanted
"to sec if' persons would keep his co mmandments when granted
significantl y free will (Abraham 3:25). Thi s desi re to lea rn
whether persons wou ld do what God comma nded assumes that
God does not ha ve co mplete foreknowledge.
2. Conditiollal prophecies. Nume rous prophec ies ex press
what God will do if certain conditions obtain. For example. several
prophecies are predictions as to what will happen iF human be in gs
behave in one way rather than another. lcremiah 18:7-8 (Rev ised
Standard Version, RSV ) is an example of a conditi o nal prophecy:
" If at any time I declare concerni ng a nat ion or II kingdo m, thaI I
will pluck up and break down and destroy it. and if that nati on.
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concerning which I have spoken, turns from its evil, I will repent
of the evi l that I intended to do to it. "19 Conditional prophecies
do not require absolute foreknowledge because God wait., upon
cond itions to occur before a course of action is finally decided.
Indeed. conditiona l prophecies are in comprehensible if God has
complete foreknowledge. There wou ld be no "ifs," only abso ~
lules.
3. Prophecie.~ of In evitable COlluqllellces of Factors Already
Present. Since God's know ledge of present condit ions is com~
plete. it follows that he knows all things that are inevitable as a
cau sa l result of present cond itions. He also knows the probability
of any future event based on current condit ions. For example, a
ski lled phys ician can predict the death of certain individuals because the causes of that death are already present. S imilarl y, God
ca n predict future events that arc causally implicated by present
ci rcu mstances or otherwise inevitable . For example, at the time
Christ prophesied that Judas would betray him, Judas had already
betrayed him by accepting thirty pieces of silver and by prom ising the Jewish authorities to ide ntify Jesus at the des ignated place.
4. Absolute Election of Na tions ami COllditiO/rai Election of
Illdividuals. A number of passages in the New Testamen t speak of
God's foreknowledge in the context of electi on or foreordina tion.
The New Testament uses a family of words assoc iated with God 's
know ledge of the future such as " forekn ow" (progiflOsko),
"foresee" (proomo), " foreordain"
(proorizo), "foreknowledge". (p rognosis ), and " forcte ll " (proma rtllromai and prokaumgelfo; sec I Peter 1:2, 20; Ephes ians 1:4-5; Romans 8:28- 30;
Acts 2:23; 4:28). For example, Ephesians 1: 11 di scusses God's
fo reordinati on of perso ns, " in whom also we have obtained an
inheritance, bei ng predest ined (prooristheflles) according to the
purpose (prothesin) of him who worketh all things after the coun sel of hi s own will (kata tell bOllle/! tOll thelmmos illltoU)." Thi s
passage does not speak about what persons do to earn elec tion;
19 Numerous examples of such conditional prophecies are found in the
Book o f Mormon. For example. the Book of Mormon prophets repeatedly testify that "'if it so he that they shall serve [Godl ac(':ording to the commandments
wh ic h hc hath gi\'cn. it shall be a land of libcrty unto them; whe refore, they
shall nc vcr bc brou!!ht down into captivity;
for if iniquity shall abound
~'urscd sh;1I1 be lhe 1:11ld for thcir s;lkcs" (2 Nephi 1:7).
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rather, il focuses exclusive ly on God 's decis ion to choose a cerlain
group of persons. Now jf individua l pe rsons were " predestin ed "
or "e lected" to salvat ion on the basis of God' s own counsel
alone , then free will wou ld p lay no role in individual salvatio n.
God would arbitraril y damn some and lea ve othe rs to damnation
for no act of the iT own. Thus it is prob le matic to assert that such
passages relate only to God' s action to elect individual s to sa lvation, as Calvin and Luther claimed.
However, passages speaking about God's electi on do not ad dress indi vidual election ; rather, they speak of the corporale eJec tion of Israel, or the church, or of God's peop le as a whole. In a
sensiti ve and carefu l analys is of the doct rine of election, Wi ll iam
G. MacDo na ld demonstrates that the bibli cal doctrine of e lection
in variabl y refers to corporale rath er than indi vid ual election. 20
The same conclusion was reached by William W. Kl ein .21 Thus
election is not a reward for an ind ivi dual exercise of free wilt but a
di vine dec ision uni laterally made to elect a group of people as his
"c hose n" or "promised" people. Althoug h the e lect ion IS ce rlain , the promises made to any indi vi dual member of the elect
gro up are condit ional upon faithfulness to God. S uc h corporate
e lection is not inconsistent wit h indi vidual free wi ll .
It is of course true that God sometimes foreorda ins individual
persons to specific callings. Yet the foreordinatio n of indi vidual s
is cond itiona l. Fo r example, God's foreordinatio n of Samson as a
chosen vessel did not impl y that il was inev itable thai Samson
would fu lfill that C<lllin g. In fact, Samson fai led. Moreover, indi vidual ca ll s represent a summons to se rvice and not a guaran tce o f
indiv idual salvati on based upon acts of free will. Thu s no pred iction is made about individual acts when an indi vidual is elected or
foreordained 10 a particular calling.

20 Willi:un O. MacDonald. 'The Ilihlic:ll Doctrine or Election." in The
ClIse for Armilli{luism: Graci' of Gnd. Iii" IVill nJ Melli. cd. Cl:lrk H. Pinnock
(Grand Rapids: Academic, 1989).207- 29.
2! William W. Klein. The New Chost'll Pen/,Ie: A CO/110mii' Vi,'lI' (!f HI'("
lioll (Grand Rapids: Ac~dcmic. 1990).
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Biblical Support for the Open View of God
The biblica l record gives strong indications that God's know ledge of future free acts is nOi complete. For example, when God
speaks in scripture he uses terms implyi ng uncertainty such as if
(Heb. 'im) or perhaps or maybe (Heb. 'iUay). Other scriptures
demonstrate that though God had expressed an intention to carry
out a certain judgment, God changes his mind when the peop le
repent. Certainly it is impossible La change one's mind if one
already know s what wil l occur.
Some rather strong indications ex ist in scripture that God does
not know all future contingents. First, even though some scriptures
present Jesus as omniscien t, it is clear that others do nOI. 22 Indeed,
Jesus seems to have expected the kingdom of God to come in
power and glory be fore the e nd of hi s presen t generation, even
before all of the sevent y returned from their miss ions throughout
Judea. 23 But it makes no sense to argue that Jesus must ha ve
known thai the kingdom was not comi ng that soon because he was
om ni sc ient, for the scriptu re express ly states that the Son of Man
did not know when the kingdom would come. Jesus does not
know all thin gs.
In the Hebrew sc ripture, the word 'ii/ay meaning " perhap s"
or "maybe" is used in div ine speech. For in stance, God is portrayed as sayin g:
Son of man. prepare for yoursel f an ex ile's baggage,
and go into ex il e by day in their sig ht. ... Perhaps
['ti/ay] they will understand, though they arc a rebel[iou s hOll se. (NSV Ezekiel 12:2-3)
T hu s says the Lord : Sta nd in the court of the
Lord's house. and speak . . .. It may be ['illay] they will
listen. and every one turn from hi s evi l way, that I ma y
repent of the ev il. (RSV Jeremiah 26:2-3; for oth er
uses of 'Iifay. sec Jerem iah 36:3, 7; 5 1:8; Isaiah 47:12;
Luke 20: 13).

22
<lml MfIIJ

23

See R:lymom.l E. Brown. "How Much Did Jesus Know '!"" in Jesus: God
(New York: "'·lxrnill:ln. 1967), 39-102.
Ihid .. 7]-79 .
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How shall we understand such passages? Terence E. Frcthcim ,
professor of Old Testament at Luthe r North weste rn Theo logical
Seminary, suggests that it "seems clear from suc h passages tha I
God is quite uncertain as to ho w the peopl e will respond to the
prophetic word. God is certainly aware of the vari ous poss ibilities
regarding Israel' s response . One mi ght even say th at God, given a
tho roughgo in g knowl edge of Israel, kno ws what its respo nse is
likely to be .... Yet, in God's o wn words. God does not finall y
kn o w ."24 That Fretheim is correct, and that God aClUally was uncertain as to what Israel would do, is supported by RSV Jeremi ah
3:7 and 19:
And I thoug ht ,
"After she has do ne all this she will return to mc";
but she d id not return . . .
" I th ou ght
how 1 would set you amon g my sons,
and g ive you a pleasant land,
a heritage most beauteou!; of a ll nati on!;.
And I thought you would cal1 me , M y Father
and wou ld not turn from fo ll owin g me.
Surely, as a faithless wife leaves her husband ,
so have you been faithless to me, 0 house of Israel. "

Frethe im observes of thi s passage; " He re God is depi cted as
actually thinking that the people would respo nd pos iti ve ly to the
initial election, or that Ih ey would return after a li me of stray ing.
But events proved that God 's ou tlook on the future was 100 opti mistic . The people d id not respo nd as God th o ug ht t hey would .
God 's kno wl edge of future human acti ons is thu s c learly re presented as li mited ."25 Pe rhaps th ose hol d ing th at God has abso lute
forekn owledge will inte rpret this passage in a manner con.sistent
with the be lief that God actua ll y knew what Is rae l would do a nd
assert that we have an example of the dreaded anthro po mo rphi sm
of the O ld Testament in thi s passage. Frethe im observes thaI suc h
readings " buy u!; an absolutc form o f o mni sc ience at the price o f
24 Terence E. Frcthc im. The Suffering of Goil: An OM T" .\·tam ('nl p,' r.~//('C
liI'e (Philadelphi,,: Fortress Press. 1984).45-46.

25 Ibid.
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placing the Integrity of the lext and coherence of a ll of God 's
word s in jeopardy: does God mean it or not? These texts show that
Israel' s fut ure is ge nuine ly ope n and not predete rmined . T he
fut ure of Israel docs not on ly not exist, it has not even been fina ll y

decided upon. Hence. it is not something that even ex ists 10 be
kno wn, eyen jf the kno wer is God. "26 It see ms to me that the onl y
way to preserve the integrity of this tex t is to admit tha t God expe rienced, nay suffe red, di sappo in tment when he disco ve red that
Israe l would reject him, espec iall y afte r expecting that Israel would
love hi m as a son loves a fath er.
Exodus 32: 7- 14 (cr. Deutero nomy 9: 13- 29), w here God is
po rtrayed as changing his mi nd after a con sultat ion with Moses, is
of simi lar Impa rl. Yahweh told Moses Ihal he inte nde d to des troy
Israel fo r ha vin g made the goldc n calf, and Moses objeclcd a nd
actuall y argued that such a coursc would be un worth y of God. As
Childs observed, the key to understandi ng the e ncoun ter is God ' s
respo nse to Moses: " Now therefore lei me alonc. that my wrat h
may burn hot agai nst [Israe li (v. 10) " ;27 God had aC lually
form ed an intcllli on to exec utc wrath; it was something that " h c
thought to do" (v. 14) , Th is passage sho ws that. while God had
dec ided to destroy Israe l, " the dec ision had not yet reached a n
irretrievable point ; Moses could conceivab ly contribuce somethin g
10 the div inc deliberation that might occ asio n 11 futurc for Israe l
other than wrath ."28 Remarkab ly, Moses pe rsuadcd G od to reca nt
what he had decided to do: " And Ihe Lord repe nted of the e vil He
thought to do unto Hi s peopl e" (v. 14). The most fa ithfu l way to
understand thi s passage. it see ms to me, is to view Yahweh as ha vin g formed an intent io n to do one thing- and thus at one time
believin g that he would do it- and al a later time changing his
mind and coming 10 believe so mething diffe rent. Yet if God did
not kno w at the time of his con ve rsat ion with Moses w hether Israe l
would bc destroyed, then certain ly Ihere we re a good many th ings
abou t the future that he did nOI know . Some Mormo ns may poi nt
out that whe n Joseph Sm it h rev ised the Bible, he c hanged all of
the passages suggestin g that God re pe nted- im plying that such
26 Ibid .. 47.
27 J. Bre va rd S. Childs. The Boole of E..r()(luJ (Philadelp hia : Westminster
Press. 1974). 567.
28 Frel hcim . TIll' SII[fc r i,Jg of COtI. 50.

li S

FARMS REVIEW OF BOOKS sn ( 1996)

changes were made becau se the Prophet Joseph Smith be lieved
that repe ntance could not be appropri ate to it be ing that ca nn o t
possibly be mistaken about any belief or sin in an y way. Nevertheless, the Joseph S mith translati on of this passa ge makes G od 's
change of mind even morc explic it, and thu s recog nizes thaI G od
changed his mind : "The Lord sa id unto Moses, If they will repe nt
of the ev il which they have done, I will spare the m .... There fore,
see th ou do this thing that I have co mmanded thee, or I will e xecute a ll that which I had th ought to do unto my peopl e" (J ST
Ex odu s 32:1 3- 14).
$ till oth er passages suggest that so me predic ti o ns of fUlUre
e vents arc conditio nal and thai God docs not kno w prec isely what
will happen , th ough he intends to pe rsuade people to freely re·
pent. A good example of stich a cond itional pro phecy is fo und in
RS V Jere mi ah 22:4- 5: " If ('im) you will indeed obey thi s word ,
then there shall enter the gates of this house kings who sit on th e
throne of Dav id .... But if (,illl ) you will not heed these word s....
thi s house shall become a deso lat io n." Numerous sim ilar co ndi tio nal prophec ies occur throughollt the Old Testa ment , the Boo k
of Mo rmon, and mode rn Mo rmo n sc riptu re. Is the if in suc h
passages to be taken with full seriousness? Fo r example, the boo k
of Abrah am suggests th at one of God's pu rposes in establi shin g
hi s plan and thi s earth was to learn something about humans: " W e
will make an earth whereon these may dwell ; and we will prove
the m here with , to see if they will do all things whatsoever the Lord
the ir God sha ll co mmand them" (Abraham 3:24- 25). It seems to
me that thi s passage does n't make any sense at a ll if the future is
already determinate and God a lready knew fro m all eternit y ex·
aCll y what we will do with out actuall y ··seein g if' persons W Ill d o
what he has commanded. Indeed, the very earneslness of mo rta lit y
in Mo rmon thought derives its force fr om the view that the future
is genuinely open and as yet undecided and the refore trul y up to
us to declare to God who we wi11 be- a fact he is waiting with
lo ving interest to discover alon g with us. God is waiting on us to
see if we will be faithful.
One final type of text may be take n as ev id ence that G od 's
knowledge is depende nt on what actu ally happens. In the book o f
Jonah . the prophet Jonah decl ared that "yet forty days, an d
Nineveh shall be overthro wn" (Jonah 3:4 ). In respo nse to this
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proc lamation, Ihe c it y of Nineveh procl aimed a fast and repe nted
of its evi l ways. "The word of the Lord" came to the king of
Nineveh: "Who can lell if ('im) God will turn and repent, and turn
away from His fierce anger, that we perish not ?" (Jonah 3:9). In
res ponse 10 the repentance of the people of Nineveh. God
changed hi s mi nd and decided not to do what he h~d declared he
would do: "And God saw the ir works. and they turned from thei r
ev il way; and God repented of the evil , that he had said he would
do unto them; and he did it not" (Jonah 3:10). Jonah's response
was undoubted ly sim ilar to what a believer in absolute foreknowledge might experience when expectat ions about God have bee n
shattered by concrete dealings with God involved in an ope n future that can have results unanticipated even by God: Jonah was
"very angry" with God. Jonah complains: "0 Lord, was not this
my saying, when I was yet in my country? ... I knew that thou art
a grac ious God, and merciful, slow to anger, and of great kindness,
and repentest thee of the ev il " (Jonuh 4:1). This picture of God
presented by patience, kindness, and me rcy is possible on ly within
a gen uine rclationship in which all responses and outcomes are
not already determ ined before the responses and decisions arc
made. Moreover, if such decisions arc not already made, then how
can it be that God infallibly knows beforehand what the decision
is? Perhaps the boo k of Jonah can teach us something about
God- maybe even someth ing unex pected and out side our preconceived not ions about how God must be. As Abraham Heschel
com mented. "This is the mysterious paradox of Hebrew faith:
The All wise and Almighty may cha nge a word that He proclaims.
Man has powe r to mod ify His design .... God's answer to Jonah,
stressing the supremacy of compass ion, upsets the possibility of
looking for a rati onal cohere nce of God's ways with the
wo rld ."29
As Clark Pinnock asserted:
Accord ing to the Bible, God anticipates the future In a
way analogous to our own experience. God tests
Abraham to see what the patriarch will do, and then
says through his messenger, "Now I know th at you
29

Abraham J. Heschel. Tire Proplrets (New York: Harper & Row, 1962),

2:66- 67 .
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fear God" (Gen. 22:12). God threatens Ni ncva h with
destruction, and then ca ll s it off when they re pent
(Jonah 3: 10). I do not receive the impress ion frol11 the
Bible that the future is all sewn up and foreknown. The
futu re is envisaged as a realm in which significant decisions can still be made which can c hange the course of
hi slory.30

4. God's Immutability and Timelessness
The authors next argue that God is un c hanging in the sense
that his nature never changes. In other words, God has always
been and always wi]) be God (p. 14). They argue. that if God is
immutable in this sense, then it follow s that he is al so timeless in
some sense (p. 15). In cont rast, they argue that in Morm o ni s m
God was once not God , because he became God through a course
of mo ral developme nt. They imply that the re was a time when
God was not fully divine (p. 4 3).
This seems to be a bit confu sed . The fa ct that God has always
been God. or even that he is con stant in character and moral re solve, does not entail that he is immutabl e or time less. For ex am ple, assume that I have had and will always have the same human
nature and morat commitmen ts. It does not follow that I ;Jill un changing, much less that I am timeless. I could move from he re to
there or change my mind while still having the same human nature. Similarly , God could at one time be angry with Israe l and at
another time be pleased with Israel and yet still be God at bo th
times. Thu s God could be both te mporal and mutable while still
remainin g God.
When medieval theologians assert that God is immutable , th ey
mean much more than that God has always had the same divine
nature . They mean that none of God' s intrin sic properties,
whether acc idental or essential. could be different. Further, if God
is timeless, then God cannot change in any sense. E veryt hing that
is true of God is true of him in the sing le nontemporal instant o f

30 Ctark Pinnock, "'God Limits His Knowledge," in Predeslillulioll (l1It1
Free Will , ed. David Basinger and Randall BaSinger (Downers Grove. Ill. : InterVarsity Press, 1986), 157.
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the cternal now. 31 Yel for something to change it must be in time,
for it must be characterized al some time before the change dif·
feren tl y from some time aftcr the change. Thus the authors are
incorrect when they assert that God's immutab le natu re entai ls
that God is timeless. However, it is true that if God is timeless, then
God is unchanging, but in a sense much stronger than they intend ed.
Though they assert thaI God does not chan ge in natu re and
that God is timeless in the sense that God's nature is not within
tcmporal succcss ion, the authors accept thai God is changing In
his "rclati onal consciousness," for they admit that :
God 's re lationa l consc iousness changed when
Nincvah rcpented- i.e., God chosc not 10 destroy th e
city- but His jlltritu-ic inTler being rema ined constant
and immutable (in this case, the moral aspect of His
nature). Hence. the change in God's re lationa l consc iousness is such that it functions in accordance wilh
Hi s immu table intrinsic inner being . In this sense, God
is immutable. (p. 15)32
Thus the authors accept that what happens in the world can affect and change "God's relational consciousness" or know ledge
of what is happening in the world . However, acceptance of this
type of change is elearly inco mpatible with both God 's immu tabil ity and time lessness. Recall the story of Jonah and Ninevah
wh i c ~ they try to explain away as a counterexamp lc to divine immutabi lity. Before Ninevah's repentance, God had warned
through Jonah that "Ni nevah will be destroyed" because the
people had bee n wicked. However, the people repented and God
was moved by thi s repentance not to destroy them. At one point
in time God inte nded to destroy Ninevah. At a latcr point in
time, after seeing Ninevah's repentance, God no longer had this
31 For d iscussions of the classical idea of timeless eternity. see Boel hius.
Tile Conso/mion of Philosopily V, 6; SI. Augustine. Confessions II , 12;
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann. "Eternity." JOl/rna/ of Phi/oso/lhy 79
(198 1): 429-58: and Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation. antllhe Conlimmln: Theories ill AllIiquilY and lite Early Mitlrlle Ages (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press. 1983), ch. 14.
32 The authors !.ITe here interpreting W. Norris Clarke.
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intention. Thu s it cCriainly seems that God changed his intent io ns
as to how he would treal the people of Ninevah . Indeed , the
authors assert that God c hanged Ihi s inlentio n "w hen " o r at the
lime the people of Ninevah rcpcmed. But the people of Ninevah
repented at a specifi c temporal time. Thus God was affected and
changed hi s resolve to destroy Ninevah a lso at Ihis time. BUI if
God changed in Ihis sense then he is both mutabl e and within
time.33
The authors also contend that the re is no problem in cancei\!+
ing a timeless God actin g in time, for it is possible for God to
time lessly will that effects occur in temporal success ion (p. 17). I
am inclined to agree that it is possible for God to will in time less
eternity and ror what is willed by God to occur in te mpo ral time.
However, it is not su fficient merely thai God time lessly wilt that a
temporal effect oceur and that it occur, for it can't be by me re
coincidence that what God wills just happens to occur. God 's will
must somehow be causally related to the effect if! f i lll e. BUI it is
problematic , to say the leasl, to coherent ly suppose that a time less
will causes the temporal effect, for causation is a te mpora l re l.1lion .34
33 The authors' argument here is merely sloppy, for it is clear that they
really don't mean what they say, They Jon', re:llly mean that God deeided nOI to
destroy the Ninevites "when," or at the tempor:ll time that the Nincvites re,
pented. What the authors really mean is thnt God timelessly knew that the people
of Ninevah would repent and that God never had any intenlion to destroy them
(p. 16). They eould say that although God told Jonah he intended to destroy
Ninevah. God really never had such intention. Since God knew Nincvah would
repent. they might argue that God timelessly intended to destroy Ninevah. However, this reading appear.; \0 mnke God a linr as to his true intentions, for he declares through Jonah that he 'foes intend to des troy Ninevah. It seems to me th at
Ihis scripture can be interpreted consistently with the text only if God is limited
in hi s fore knowledge. At the time he threatened deslruction he expected Ninevah
to continue in its wickedness. He didn' t know Ninevnh would repent. Ik was
pleasantly surprised when they did repelll. This interpretation e ntails that God's
intentions changed when the Ninevites repented and that he is thus mutahle and
temJK1Tal. or changing and within temporal succession.
34 For example, suppose that God has timelessly willed th:1I it will rain in
May 1997. There must be more than just God's wi lling that it rain and that it i 11
fael rains. for it eannot be just by chance that it ra ins. God must cause it to rain .
But when does th is cause occur? It secms thaI God's causa l activity cannOI remain
isolated from temporal succession because a cause must be temporally con tinuous with the temporal effect. Thus God's will e:mnot remai n untainted hy

BECKWITH, PARRISH, CONCEPT OF GOD (OS'rl£R)

123

It is for this reason that I believe it remains problematic to assert that a timeless God creates a world, enters inlo a relationship
or responds to a prayer, for all of these action s presuppose a
causal (or at least a dependence relationship) and therefore a temporal relationship between God and the world.
Finall y, the authors argue that the notion that God " pro gresses" or is otherwise temporal is not scriptural. The authors
cite several Old Testament texts (Psalm 90:2; Isaiah 40:28; 43: 1213; 57 :15) that use the word 'oliim, and assume it refers to timelessness (p. 121 ). However, it merely means an indefinite period
of time. It docs not mean a timeless eternity .3 5 None of the scriptures cited by the authors support any conclu sion stronger than
that: (I) God's character and commitment are stable and un chan ging ; (2) God is everlasting or has always existed; and ( 3 )
God is immune from the ravages of time. They do not support the
stronger claim made by the authors that God transcends all temporal succcssion and chan ges in no intrin sic properties .
Almost all biblical scholars agree that God's time is different
from the time-metric of our world , but that God is involved in a
temporal relation to the world. 36 Terence Fretheim concluded:
The God of the OT is thus not thought of in terms
of timelessness . At least since creation, the divine life is
temporall y ordered .. . . God is nOl above [he fl ow of
time and hi story, as if looking down from some suprat emporal mountaintop on all the streams of people
through the valleys of the age. God is "ins ide time,"
not outside of it. . .. The OT witnesses to a God who
trul y shares in human hi story as past, present and future, and in such a way that we must speak of a history
of God.37

tempornl ity ifGod's will is a tem poral cause of a tcmpor:1l cffect-God·s causal
ncti\fi t ~ of the rain in May 1991 .
3
Ernst Jc nni. "Das WOrt 'olum im Alten Testamem:' Ze.ilsch rljl f iir die
a/lll'slanwlIllirlu: Wis!if'IIJchtljl64 (1952): 197- 248, and 65 (1953): 1-35.
36 Scc Ro lf Knierim. "Cosmos nnd History in Israel" s Theology," Hori·
: mu ;/1 Wbiica/ Th eology 3 ( 1981): 7 1- 86: James Barr. IJiblic{l! lVords fo r
Time. rcv. ed (London SCM. 19M!); Fretheim. The SlIffering oiGm/, 39-44 .
37 Fretheirn . Tile Suffering of God. 43-44.
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A number of Old Testament passages clearly entail separate
temporal moments in God's interna l life:
He will nOI always chide,
neither will he keep hi s anger for ever.
(Psalm 103:9; cf. Isaiah 57: 16; Jeremiah 3:12; Micah 7: 18)

Hi s anger is but for a moment,
and his favor is for a lifet ime.
(RSY Psalm 30:5; cf. Ezra 9:8; Ps. 85:3)
For a brief moment I forsook you ....
In overfl owing wrath for a moment
I hid my face from you,
but with everlasting love I will have compassion o n

yOll.

(RSV Isaiah 54:7- 8; cf. Isaiah 26:20; Exodu s 33:5)
The same concl usion is supported by the New Testament. The
authors cite two lexls that use the word aian, translated in Roman s
I :20 variously as "eve rl ast ing" o r "cternal ," in the sense of c nduring through all timc. They also cite I Timothy 1:17, whic h
calls God the "eternal kin g" or "ki ng of ages" (in the KJV)trans lati ng the phrase "basilei tOil aiollon." It is quite ironic that
these texts support the view that God is everlastin g--or exist s forever in a temporal framework - not the view that he is ti meless in
the sense of transcending temporal stlccc ssion .3 8
The most important study on the subject of the concept of
"etern it y" in the Bible forcefully argues that the idea of an abso lute time less cternity is absent from the New Testament- just as
it is from the O ld Te stament. 39 A si milnr concl usion was reac hed
in a reccnt study by Alan Padgett, who concluded: " If the OT and
the NT nowhere teach nor imply an absoltlle timeless di vi ne ete rnily, how did exegetes and theologians so deceive themselve s?
Cu llman is sure ly rig ht to point to the influence of Platoni sm on
the Christian tradition."40
38 Joseph H. Thayer. A Greek-Elrglish LnicO/I of lire NT. 70th cd . (G r.md
Rapids: Zondcrv:m. 1979). 18-20.
39 Oscar C u llm.. n. Clrri.1I ami Time. rev. cd. (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1964).
40 Alan Padgett. COli, Ell'mil)" allllille Nalure of Tilll<' (New York: 51.
Martin's Press. 1992). 35; d . 24- 37.
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Once again we find Beckwilh and Parri sh chiding Mormons
for not worshipp ing the God of Plato and Aristotle. The God of
Abraham is a very different be ing from the God they propose.

5. God as the Source of Moral Values and as
Perfectly Good
The authors also argue that God is perfectly good in the sense
that he logically can not fail to be good (pp. 22- 23). They assert
that , in contrast, it is logically poss ible for the Mormon God to
make mora ll y wrong dec isions because he became God by mak ing free decisions and cou ld ha ve failed to become God (p. 44).
Thu s they conclude that their God is a perfectl y good God
whereas the Mormon God is not. I think that they intend the ir
readers to conclude (though they do not say) that the class ical
God is morall y superi or to the Mormon God . However, I be lieve
that this pos iti on is rather deceptive becau se, properly speaking,
the classica l God is not a moral being in any meanin gful sense.
In my view the doctrine of God' s es~ential goodness is a hard
pill to swallow . The upshot of the doctrine is that God is not (/
moral agen t because it is not possible for God to make any morall y wrong decisions. It is certainl y no great moral defect to be so
vi rtuou s that one does not make morally wrong decisions; it is
quite anoth er proble m if the reason no wrong decisions are made
is that it is logically impossible to make a wrong decision. The
Mormon God can be relied upon to make morall y correct decisions because (I) the Godh ead is a perfect loving unity and (2)
the indi vidual divine persons have forged a characte r solidl y
co mmitted to the good over aeons of time. The Mormon God is a
mora l being whereas the class ical God prese nted by the aut hors is
not. In my opin ion, the Mormon God is the only candidate in the
running for a morally perfect being.
I also think that the doctrine that moral principles arc simp ly
identical to God's will is nO( philosophica ll y acceptable. While
God certainl y can impose mora l obli gati ons upon his creatures 10
respond to hi s co mmands arising out of hi s love and gracious acts,
the divine command theory presented by the aut hors entails that
good and evil are arbitrary. Th e auth ors recognize the problem
created by asserting that somet hing is good merely because God
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co mmands it. for God could then command thai our entire mo ral
duty consists in murdering six million Jews and thai such acts
would have to be considered "good." However, they alter thi s
doctrine by locating the source of mo ral values not in God's will,
but in God's natu re. S ince God 's will is subject to his essentia ll y
good nature, they claim that God can never will anything evil.
Moreover. th ey argue that moral values arc not arbitrary because
God 's nature is the same in every possible world. However, if
God 's nature is logically prior to God 's will, the n God is st uck
with whatever his nature happens to dictate-and in thi s sense
moral values arc clearly arbitrary. God is not morally free on suc h
a view because he cannot will that hi s nature be different. Finally,
love becomes the ultimate mora l princ ipl e on suc h a view rathe r
than God's will-so they effectively abandon the divine command
theory they seek to defe nd . Accordin gly, these proble ms are suffici ent reason to jeuison the classical view of God's log icall y necessary goodness. I prcfcr the Mormon vicw that sees God as a person who is worthy of praise and worship precise ly becau se he
coul d go wrong, but in the excel lence of hi s perso nal character
has freely decided to do what is good .4t The bott om line is that
the Mormon God is a moral being in the full est sense, whereas it is
doubtful that the God presented by Beckwith and Parri sh is mora l
10 any meaningful sense.

6. Can the Universe Be Infinitely Old?
Joseph Smith rejectcd the doctrine of c reati o n ex nihilo, affirming rathe r that the most basic constituents of the world (intelligences and chaotic matte r) are begin ni ngless, self-ex istent . an d
uncreated. Thi s view seems to impl y that the world 's co nstilUents
arc infinitel y o ld and that there has been an infinite series of
event s in time. Many of the aut ho rs' philosophical objecti ons \ 0
Mormon the ism are variations of the age-old arguments agai nst
the possibility of an actual infinite. The fo llowing argument wh ich
the authors tak e from William L. Craig is representati ve:
41 A number of others prefer thi.~ view for si milnr rensons. See A. A.
Howsepian. "Is God Necessarily Good?" ReligiOUS Studies 27 (December 1991) :
473-84; Robert F, Brown, "God's Ability \0 Will Moral Evil." Faitlr Will 1'1Iilosollily 811 (1 nnunry 199 1): 3- 20,
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I . The series of events in time is a collection formed by
adding one member after another.
2. A collection fo rmed by add ing one member after another
cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the serie!) of event s in time cannot be actually
infinite.
Of course, Mormons will reject both premises 1 and 2. The
authors try to prove premise 2 by reducin g its negation to an absurdity. If the series of events has no beginning. then every event
has been preceded by an infinite number of events. But if one can
never arrive at infinity by adding one member after another, one
would have never arrived at the present day, because to do so one
wou ld have had to "c ross" (or co mplete) an infinite number of
days. Or course, if this argument or any of its related variants is
sound. then not on ly are certain formulation s of Latter-day Saint
theism incoherent, but so al so is the deity of process theo logy,
which has always existed in a process of ever greater organi zing
perfection, and al so the temporal deity of Christians elucidated by
Nicholas Wolterstorff. Ri chard Swinburne, etc. In addition. the
view of many theo logians such as Origen and Thomas Aquinas
that God could have created a world from all temporal eternity is
similarly re ndered fal se.
The authors argue that because an actual infinite is impossible.
an array of Mormon be liefs is fal se, including the view that the
world is eternally old, that beings eternall y progress. that an infinite number of spirits exists and that omniscience in a spatially
infinite world is impossible (ch. 3). Now thi s type of argument is
not new, and with the exception of its appli cation to particular
Mormon beliefs, is merely a rehash of William Craig's argume nts
against process thou ght. 42 The argument that an actual infinite is
impossible has been accepted by very few philosophers and in fact
has been refuted, decisively in my view. by a number of modern
ph ilosophers. 43 Nevertheless, the authors dust the argument off
42 Beckwith and Parrish's entire argument is dependent upon William
Cmig almost to the point of plagiarism. See. Craig. "Creation ell ni hilo," in
PI'Qn'H Theology, 143- 73.
43 Sec c.g., Graham Oppy, "Craig, Mackie. and thc KlIltllll Cosmological
Argument:' RdigioUJ Studies 27 (June 199 1): 189- 97; Adolph Griinbaum, 'The
Pseudo,Prohlem of Crcatiofl in Physical Cos1l1ology," I'hiloSQphy of Science 56
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for another fQund and imply that Mormons should jump ship becau se they have an argument to show that their world view is fa lse.
To understand whether, and if so how, an actual infinity is
possible has been a vex in g probl em from antiquity, at least since
Zeno formulat ed his fam ous parado xes. 44 Zello arg ued Ihal in
order for the arrow 10 reach the target or the hare to catc h the
tortoi se. they would fir st have to traverse an infinite numbe r o f
halfway points. But th is was logically impossible . I think that we
are justified in seeing such infinity arguments as a sleight-or-hand
trick like Zeno's paradoxes, for even though a baseball must pass
through an infinite number of halfway po ints to reach the
catcher's mitt, somehow the baseba ll actuall y makes it to the mitt,
just as the arrow reaches the target and the hare passes the torto ise.
The " magic" occurs in di stracting attentio n from the fact that the
log ic of infinite sets differs fro m the logic applied to indi vidual
members of such sets.
Several different versions of the argument des igned to show
that an actual infinite is impossibl e arc given by the auth ors. Th e
first version is roughl y that it is imposs ibl e to traverse an infin ite
number o f days, for no matter how long one were trave lin g, o ne
would still only have traveled a finite number of days. Since the
uni verse began "an infinite number of days ago ," it could never
reach the present. Unless one can reach an " infinite number o f
days ago" the uni verse cannot be infin ite ly old (pp . 55- 57).
However, thi s type o f argume nt co mmits the (rath er obvio us)
logica l fallacy of compositio n. It ass umes that the first day in an
infinite set mu st ha ve the same properties as the infinite set o f
days, that is, that some day is the " infinitieth d ay." There is no
such thin g as a day which occurred an " infinite number of days
ago" simply because there is no such thing as the "infiniti e th
day ." The same fallac y is committed when a person asserts that a
(September \989): 373-94; Norman Krctzma nn , "Creation ab acte rno: Can the
World Have Been Created BeginninglesslyT forthcoming; Richard Swinburne.
Space and Tim e . 2nd cd. (London: Macmillan, 198 1), eh. 15: Sorabji. Time.
Creariorr, and IIw Conrimlllm, eh. 14: John L. Mackie, Tire Mimek of TI,eism
(Ox ford: Clarendon l>ress, 1982). 93- 94. T homas Aquinas and William of
Oekham both rejeeted infinity arguments based on logic. Kan t thought that both
the a Ffirmation and the denial of nn actual infinity presented antinomies of
thought.
44 See Sorabji, Time Creariol!, (/1/(/ rlu' COIllimmm, eh. 14.
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large crowd of people must be a crowd of large people~and that
also is clearly false. It is also like saying there cannot be an infinite num ber of integers unless one of them is the "i nfinitieth "
in teger-whi ch is clearly wrongheaded. Thus one who be lieves
that the uni verse is in fini tely old does not assert that one of those
days was the infiniti eth day which occ urred an infin ite number of
days ago. Rather, any given day occurred a finit e time ago even
though there is an infinite set consisting of days during wh ich the
world has ex isted. There simp ly is no first day, so the argument is
invalid.
The authors respond to this type of answer that
actua ll y, the fact thai there was no first moment really is
of no help .... The absence of a first term merely aecentllales the problem of affirming an infinite past, ...
for if one cannot in princi ple reach a day that occurred
an infin ite number of days ago, . . . this only goes 10
prove the imposs ibility of traversi ng an actual infinite.
(pp. 57-58)
Now thi s is a remarkab le response indeed, for the authors claim
their argument is even stronger if the premises are false! The reason Ihat one cannot reach a day Ihat occurred an infinite number
of days ago is that Ihe very nolion is a category mi stake. Once
again . infinity is a property of the entire set of moments that make
up the in finite past. nOi a properly of any individual moment.
Thus ,he e ntire argument is a disaster in reasoning.
A second argumen t is based upon the supposed paradoxe s
that arise from unequal infinities. For examp le, suppose Ihat we
have an infinile sel of baseball cards from which we give away
100,000 card s 10 charity. The authors assume that the number of
cards in the infinite set is equal to the set with 100,000 fewer cards
because, after all , both are infinile in number. They object. "t he se
conclusions are patently absu rd " (p. 66). Now this argument
consists of a mistake n view that all infinities must be equa l and
expresses a mere prej udice against an actual infin ite~and not hing
more. Once one grasps the intricacies of infinite set theory
(which Ihe authors have apparentl y fail ed to do) there is nothin g
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contradictory in unequal infinities. 45 This conclu sion may be
strange or even exciting, but not incoherent.
The fallacy is that , as the mathe matician Canto r has e legantl y
shown, not all infinite sets mu st be equal. Cantor bids us to co n ~
sider two infinite bUl unequal sets, the sel of a ll o rdinal numbe rs
and the set of all even numbers. The coherence of infinite sets that
are unequal can be demonstrated by pairing me mbers of each set
in a onc-Ia -one correspondence . Even thoug h both sets are infi nite, the set of even numbers is only half as large as the set of ordinal numbers. The auth ors acknowledge a coherent mathematical
theory in which infinities are not equal , but they object that a mere
coherent theory of infinite numbers does not mean that th ere
could actu ally be an infinite collection in the real world (pp. 6667). Yet the ir elaim is precisely that the notion is log icall y
"incohere n!. " How can they admit suc h coherence and yet cla im
that unequal infinities cannot occur in the actual world ? If the no tion is log icall y coherent, then there is a possible world in whi ch it
can obtain . The furth er question as to wheth er an infinite coll ectio n actually exists is not an issue of logic but o f e mpirica l ev iden ce- and they offer no ev idence that such infiniti es arc impos sible in the actual world .
Mo reo ver, there is strong intuiti ve support for the view that the
uni verse could be infinitel y o ld . One must ask at what po int in the
past it becomes logicall y imposs ible th at the world exi sts. It seems
that no matter how far back in time one goes to any particul ar past
moment , it is log icall y poss ible that the world ex isted at that
mo ment. But how large is the collection o r series o f moment s at
which it is poss ible that the world existed ? The number certainly
appears to be unlimited or infinite. But if the collectio n of limes al
which it is possibl e that the world exi sts is infinite, it fo llo ws that it
is cohere nt to assert that the world is infinitel y o ld . Thu s there is
good reason to be lieve that the uni verse could have e xisted without beginning.
I j udge the arguments o f Beckwith and Parri sh to show that an
actual infinite is impossible to be not onl y a failure, but a rathe r
mi serable failure at that. They o ffer other arguments, but they can
all be an swered a lon g lines that I have o utlined above.

45 Sec Mockic, The Miracle of TlreiJ·m. 91 - 95.
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7. Does Mormonism Better Explain Existence?
In chapter 4, thc authors c hallcnge David L. Pau lsen' s claim
that the argumen t from design supports the God of Mormon
thei sm ma rc convi nc ingly than the God of classical thei sm. 46 He
has argued that while the appare nt design in the world points to an
inte lligent designe r, the world's equall y apparent disorder and
evolutionary development point to an intelligent designer who is
not abso lutely unlimited or uncond iti oned. The authors' discussion effectively challenges Latter-day Saint thinkers to exp lain
more clearly how divine theology fits into their lotal world view,
but two of their mai n objections to Paulsen's argume nt are
see min gly based on mi sunderstandings. They claim that si nce the
God of Latter-day Sain t theism is not a necessary be ing, he ca nnot serve as ex planation of our world's apparent teleology. But
Joseph Smith ex plic itl y tau ght , and Mormon s gene rally believe,
that God is a self-ex istent bein g-thus there is no poss ible world
in which he fail s to exist. 47
A second main objecti on is that Latter-day Saint theism " i s
not the only possib le way to ex plain the disorder and order of the
world, since the facts cou ld be explained equally well by a number
of differe nt hypot heses, such as an infinite God who is uninterested in immora lit y, a couple of warrin g Gods (one good and one
evi l)" (pp . I 04 ~5). The authors' objection mi sses the point, for
the claim they make is not one that Paulsen has denied. He arg ued
on ly that Latter-day Saint theism account s for our world's actual
mix of orde r and disorde r more illuminatingly than docs classical
the ism. not that there is no other possible ex planation. For exampIc, why wou ld God plod through miJ1ions of years of evo lution
with the ent ire scene of tooth and claw, blood and pain ex peri enced by anima ls if he could have created high ly evolved orga nisms in stantly? Paul sen shows that Latte r-day Saint theism can account for such facts. The auth ors simp ly fail to address this issue.
46 David L. Paulsen. "Comparative Coherence of Mormon (Finistic) and
CI:Jssical Theism" (Ph .D. diss .• University of M ichig~Ln, 1975).
47 Sec. e.g .. lhe Kin g Follet Discourse. "We say that God was sclf-existantl.] who told you so? It's correct enough but how did you get the idea into your
hC:ldsl? ]" in Andrew F. Eh:lt and Lyndon W. Cook. comps. and cds .. The Words of
Joseph Smilh (Provo, Utah: nyu Religious Studies Center. t980). 359.
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One last comment is in order about their final argu ment. The
authors contend (in chapter 4) that only a logically necessary God
can fully explain the ex istence of the ordered matenal universe.
The authors nowhere show that God's ex istence is logically necessary. and very few C hri stians accept ontological arguments purporting to demonstrate the poinr. However, they claim that the
Mormon God won't do because the Mormon God is himself an
organized being in need of ex planation. But their argument is
wrongheaded twice over. First, God is a necessary being in
Mormon thought. Second, the ir assumption that Iheism can provide a full explanation of existence is illusory_
Add ressing the second point first, theism has no compl ete explanation of existence. Even if the existence of everything but the
classical God can be explained by reference to God, it is sti ll the
case that God's decision to create is a mattcr of ultimately u nexplained exerc ise of frce wi ll. Thus, within Christian thought, any
auempt to find an ultimate causal explanat ion for why someth in g
ex ists at al l is ult imately an unexplained fact.
On the other hand, it seems perfectly acceptable 10 regard the
material uni verse's existence as not needing an explanation. For
example, uniform motion docs not need an explanation in Newtonian physics. What needs explanat ion is change of motion. To
remain in motion is natural g iven the Newtonian system of physical explanation. Similarly as the conservati on laws of modern sc ience demonstrate, ex istence is the Ilatural state of mass/energy.
Given conservation laws, the existence of mass/energy docs not
need an explanation. Given Mormon cos mo logy, the ex istence of
mass/energy needs no exp lanati on- it is the natural state of the
universe. What needs explanat ion is the intricate design of the universe for human purposes. Thus the entire argument that the
authors offer in chapter 4 of their book is based on a questionable
assumption, i.e., that the ex istence of mass and energy is in need
of explanation.

8. Do Mormons Misconstrue Scriptures?
On the issue of whether the Mormon or the classical concept
of God is closer to the biblical portrait, the authors (a) lake
Mormons to task for imposing their own previously adopted
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world view on the biblical texl and (b) argue that when the text is
a llowed to speak fo r itself, it provides a concept of God that is
nearly. if not absolutely. identical with the classical view. With regard to (a), the au thors argue:
Mormons begin the ir interpretation of the Bible
with the assumpt ion that Joseph Smith is God's prophet
and that his teachings are correct. And since Smit h's
teachings include the Mormons' unique concept o f
God, Mormons tend to "find " their view in the Bible.
. .. He nce. only by presupposil1g the truth of thei r
pos iti on are the Mormons successful in " fin d in g"
the ir concept of God in the Bible. C learly this is a case
of ci rcular reasoni ng. (p. 109)
No doubt the authors have provided a correct description of
how many Mormons interpret the bib lical text. But whether this is
proper practice or question-begg ing seems to depend on context.
Wi thill the perspective of the ulftcr-day Sllillf community. this
sec ms to be a perfect ly proper way to read the text. Laue r-day
Saints believe that the biblical text constitutes anc ient revelation
and that God has resumed (with Joseph Smith) and conti nues to
give (through Smi th's successors) revelation in aUf day. Mormons
read the ancient revelations in the light of what they take to be
God's tota l. espec ially his con temporary, revelat ion. What cou ld
be more reasonable'? On the other hand, the aulhors seem qu ite
right ~n this point: over against olle who does not accep' mudem
rel'clation to thus argue fo r a Mormon interpretation of the Bible
is indeed circular and quest ion-begging. However, the a utho rs'
objection itsclf is also questi on-begging. The prior quest ion to be
resolved is: Are Joseph Smi th and his successors God's prophets?
And this question will have to be resolved on some basis other
than a biblical exeges is whic h assumes ei ther that they are or are
not.
With regard to (b), the authors attempt to formu late some
metap hys ically neutral principles of interpretati on, and then
pu rportedly use them in reac hi ng the conc lus ion that the biblical port rait of God just is the cl assical view. Unfortunately, il
seems obvious that the aut hors make exactly the same kind of
move Ihey chide the Mormons for mak in g: a.Hllming a part icular
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me taphys ical world view a nd read ing the te x i from that
perspect ive. And they do ii, not o nly by way of vioialion , but in
the very formulation, of the ir own he rme ne ut ical pr inciples. T o
de mo nstrate the lalle r point first the authors pro pose f o ur
pri nc iples of biblical inte rpre ta t ion : ( I) " Permit the lex t [ 0 s peak
for itse lf. That is, unless the tex t is obvious ly sy mbo lic o r
fi gurati ve.
we s hould stic k to the plain meaning of the tex t,
a nd not read into the Bible doctrines that a re othe rw ise to ta lly
f oreign to the te xt ." (2) In te rpre t script ural passages in li ght o f
their immediate and general "spheres of conte x1. " (3) Do not

"confuse passages that spec ificall y speak of God's essence with
those whic h describe G od 's relatiollship to humans." (4) Do no t
"reason that because the Bible docs no t specifica ll y forb id o r
me nti on some th ing, the re fore the B ib le impl ic itl y approves of i I "
(pp . 110- 12), But princ iple 3 contradic ts princ iple 1. Princ ip le 3
appare ntly in struc ts us (and the authors fai thfu ll y follow the
instruc tion) to read the te xt in the light of the A ristot elia nT hom istic d octrine of essence- a d oc trine that is tota lly foreign to
the te xt- rathe r than pe rmitting the text 10 spea k fo r itself as
req uired by pri nc iple 1.
As an instance o f the authors' violat ion of prin cip le I, con s ide r their argume nt that the Bible teac hes c reation ex !lilli/o. T hey
c ite severa l bib lical passages that ide nt ify God as the c reato r of all
things, and the n arg ue: "S ince pre-ex iste nt maile r wou ld be th e
material cause of the universe, a nd s ince this passage teaches tha t
no cause except G od can account for the uni verse, th is passage
clearly teaches c reation ex tzihi l o" ( pp. 117 n. 16; 126). Th e
a uthors assume that bib lical write rs we re fami liar with the A ristote li a n doct rine of " mate r ia l cau se" and meant to e xclude it w he n
they ide nt ified G od as c reator.
Rathe r tha n reac hing their conc lu sions on the bas is of presuppos ition less princ iples of inte rpreta tion, it see ms appa re nt that th e
authors reac h the m o n the basis of the ir o wn presupposed world
vie w.
1n all likelihood the re is no me taph ysicall y neutra l way to read
the text. If so , why feign one?
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Is Crea tion Ex Nihilo Scriptural?
Many non-Mo rmon scholars, who ha ve carefully Ireated this
issue, reject the authors' claims that the Bible ( i) teaches that t he
un ive rse was created by God out o f noth ing, and ( ii) nowhere
teaches that the world was created out of preex istent matter
( p , 116), For instance, with respect to the fi rst claim. Richard
Sorabji concludes: "There is no c lear state me nt in the Bible, o r in
Jew ish- He lle nistic literature. of creation out of noth ing (in a sense
which includes a beg inning of the material un iverse). On the co ntrary, such a view was in vented by Christians in the second century
A. D .• in controve rsy with t he Gnos tic s."48 Dav id Win ston c o nc urs .49 The no ti on was first expressed by the C hri stian Neoplato nist T atian50 a nd by Theophil us c irca 185 A.D. 51
Moreover. as to the second claim. the Bibl e con lain s c lear
stateme nts of creation out of c haos,5 2 Job c hapters 28 and 38 re fer to God bring ing order out of preexi sti ng chaos, Moreover,
Genesis I : I seems 10 be a clear referenc e to creati on out of c haos .
The Harper 's Bible Commentary read s:
As most modern tran slations recog nize . the P creatio n account ( I : 1- 2 :4a) begin s with a te mporal clause
(" When. in the beginni ng. God c reated "); such a
translati on puts Gen. I: I in agreemenl with the open ing
of the J acco unt (2 :4b) and with other ancient, Near
Eastern creation myths .. , . The desc ri ption o f the pre.c reat ion stale in v.2 probab ly is meant to suggest a
storm-tossed sea : darkness . a great wind, the water abyss
, ' . c haotic forces .53

48
49

lOry of

50
51

Sombji, Time, Crell/ioll , (md Ihe Conlimm l/l, 194.
D:1Vid Winsto n, " The Book of Wisdom's Theory of Cosmogony," His·
Religiolls II (197 1- 72): !l15- 202.
Tatian, All Crecos 5,
T heop hitus, Ad A wa/ye!lIn II , 4 and 10.
See Harry A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Unive rsity

52
Press, 1948), 1:302-3.
53 Jnmes L. Mays, cd .. lJarfler'~' /Jib/e Commentary (San Francisco:
Harpe r and RolV, 1988),87.
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The most respected comme ntary on Gc n c~ i s is by E. A. Spieser.
who translates I : I in the snmc way (as a temporal clause) and the n
adds:
To be sure, the present interpretatio n prec:llfdes th e
view that the creation accounts in Genes is say nothin g

about coexistent matter. The question, however, is not
the ultimate truth about cosmogony, but onl y the e xact
meaning of the Genes is passages whi ch deal with th e
subject. . . . At all events, the text should be all owed to
s peak for ilself.5 4
The drama of God' s creat ing by organi zing chaos is tho roughly treated by Jon D. Leven son, the Albert A. List Professor at
Harvard University:
Although it is now generatly recognized that cre(lf ;oll
ex nihilo . . is nOI an ad equate c haracteri zati on o f
creati on in the Hebrew Bible, the legacy of this d ogmatic or propos iti onal tlnde rstanding li ves on and co ntinues to distort the perceptions o f scho lars and lay persons alike. In particular, a fal se fin ality and definiteness
is ascribed to God 's act o f creation , consequent ly, th e
frag ili ty of the created order and it s vulnerabi lit y to
chaos te nd to be played down.55

If Beckwith and Parri sh desire to reject the notion of God 's
crcating by organizing a cosmos out of c haos, they mu st o verlook
the primary thrust of the Hebrew Bib lc. But they are not al one in
wearing opaque eyeg lasses that blind them to this biblical view. for
centuries of theologians steeped in Augu stinian theol ogy ha ve
done the same.

9. Monotheism and a Plurality of Divine Persons
The aut hors also c hide Mormons becau se they teach that
" there exi sts more than one God land that] ... an individual c an
54 E. A. Speiser, Genesis: The Anchor Bible Commentary (Gardcn Ci ty:
Doubleday, 1964). 13, emphasis added.
55 Jon D. Levc nson, Creatiot/ at/d Ihe PersiSlet/ce of Evil (Princcton Uni ·
vcrsity Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1987), xxix .
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progress to Godhood" (p. 113). They present a statement from
an evangel ical scholar to the effect that Elohim reaJly can not mean
"gods" when referring to Israel' s God, and then conc lude:
Any "s uccess ful" argument from the Bible to defend
the Mormon view of polythei sm must commit the logical fallacies of argument from ignorance and begging
the question , and that is too high a price to pay for
"b ibli cal support." Therefore, it is safe to say without
reservation that the Bible supports strict monotheism,
and hence, den ies the ex istence of any god bes ides the
one true and li ving God. (p. 11 4)
The au th ors give no examples of Mormon usage of scripture,
do not explain the biblical support Mormons claim for Iheir do c~
trine of a "p lura lit y of gods," and generally assu me that any
Mormon usage of sc ri pture to support their view must be log ically
fallacious. About the onl y thin g Ihat can be concluded "w ilhout
reservati on" from the authors' smug argument is that the auth ors
ha ve co mmitted the fa llac ies of hasty genera lizat ion and exp ressin g a mere prejudice. Nor do the authors ever expla in what th ey
mean by '''strict monotheism. " However, any Chris tian who accepts the Trinity sure ly accepts something less than "s trict
monotheism."
Take. for ex ample, one of the scriptures c ited by the aUlhors
to support their vicw of "stri ci monothei sm": " For Ihere is one
God, alld there is olle mediator between God ami men, the man
Christ Jcsus" (RSV I Timoth y 2:5). If there is on ly one God, who
is thi s man that is a mediator between God and man? Cena inly if
thi s one God is the only God, then th is mediator is not a God. Yet
the New Testament repeatedl y claims Ihal this medialor is God.
How can we reconcile these two claims?
Or take another e xample of a scripture qu oted by the authors
10 show Ihat there is only one God: "But to us there is but one
God , the Father. of whom are all things, and we in him; and one
Lord Jeslls Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him "
( I Corinth ians 8:6). If there is one God who is the Father, the n
who is this second person who is Lord? The use of the term Lord
was surely underslOod to be a reference to Yahwe h, Ihe God of the
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Old Tcstament. 56 But now we sec why the presentation of the
authors is less than straightforward- such passages cannot logically be reconciled with the authors' view of God. Consider the
following:
a.

There is only one God (Assumption of Strict Monotheism).
b. The Father is God.
c. The Son is God.
d. The Father is not the Son.

The affirmation of any three of these premises entails the denial of the fourth. From premise a, b, and c it follows that the Son
and Father are identical-the Sabellian heresy or modal ism arose
from this view that the Father and the Son are merely different
modes of manifestation of the onl y God. But such a view must
deny the very fundamental Christian assertion that the Father is
not identica l to the Son. The mediator between the Father and
humankind can not be identical to the Father. Yet Ihis appears to
be the position taken by the authors.
On the other hand, the authors accuse Mormons of de nying
premise a, and thus affirming that there is more than one God.
Such a position is clearly entail ed by acceptance of premises b, c,
and d. Whether there is only one God or more, however, depends
on the sense in which the word God is used. There is an equi vocation in the word "God" in Ihis argument. In premise a, if the
word "God" refers to the enti re Godhead, or the three divine persons who are united as "one divine agency," then it is consistent
with the New Testament. Mormons can accept premises band c
on ly if Ihe word "God" refers 10 the individual divine pe rsons
rather than to "God's essence" or to the Trinily as a whole, as the
authors use it. The failure to understand the nature of this equi vocati on has led to a mi sunderstanding of the Mormon position by
both Mormons and non-Mormons.
A clear distinction between the divine perso ns allows a co herent notion of three divine persons united as one God. For exa mple, it is coherent to assert the conjunction of: (a) There is only
one Godhead; (b) the Father is a divine person; (c) the Son is a
56 Sec Larry W. Hurtado. O"e God. O"e Lord: Eo.rly Christia" Dl'I'OIiol!
Oo"d Ancient Jewish Monotheism (Phi ladelphia: Fortress Press. 1988).96- 97.
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divine person, but (d) the Father is not identi cal to the Son. The
rcason that these propos itions are conjointly cohe rent is that the
word "God" functi ons differently when it refers to the Godhead
than when it refers to the individual di vine pe rson s.
Beckwith and Parr ish fail to unde rstand the different senses in
whi ch Mormons-and the bib lical record- use the word God. For
ex ample, it is perfectl y coherent to say that in water there is a single molecule of water; yet there are three atoms in this one mo lecule, two of hydrogen and one of oxy gen . Molecu les exist on a
differen t le vel of organizat ion than aloms. Thus on the mo lecular
le vel of exi ste nce there may be only one en tity while on the
atom ic level there are many ent ities in that one th ing. In a simi lar
way, it is coherent to assert that there is a single God or Godhead ,
yet the re are th ree di vine person s ;' in" God. When the divine pe rsons are united in a profoundl y lov ing relati onshi p it is app ropri ate to recognize that they lIeceHarily act as one being on a new
level of corporate exi stence. There is a single mind in the sense
that what one di vine person knows, the others know ; what o ne
will s, the others will. There is also a sin gle act for any state of affairs brought about by the divine persons acti ng as one almi ghty
age ncy. What one docs, they all do. Thus, in this sense, there is
onl y one God.
The New Testament also uses the word God to refer in a
unique way to the Father. The Apostle Pau l reserves the designator
God for the Fat he r and refers to the Son by other designators such
as mediato r or SOI/ or Lord.57 Thus ill this sem..e there is also onl y
one God, the Fathe r. A sim ilar e mphasis upon the Father as God
in a unique sense is found in the Gospel of John . In the Prol ogue,
the Word is tru ly God, but the fact that he is God in a mode that is
di stinct from the way that the Father is God is clearl y noted by the
faci that the term the God (I/O rh eos) is reserved for the Father,
whe reas the Word is simp ly God (rh eos): " In the beg inni ng the
Word was with the God, and the Word was God , in the be ginn ing
the Word was wit h the God" (John I: I, literal trans lat ion from the
Greek). The di stincti on between the Word and the God is also e m ~
phasi zed by the prepositiona l phrase with God or next to GodCornelius PI:l nlinga Jr. , ··Social T rin ity and Tri theism:' in Trinity. In ·
(I/UI A/ollellle/ll. ed. ROn:lld J. Feenstra and Corne li us Planti nga J r.
( Not re Dame; University of NoIre Dume Press, 1989).24-25.
57

cammi()JI.
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tOil Iheoll. There is thu ~ a very clear di stinc tion between the
Father as God and the Word as God , and yet both arc God .58
However, the Son does not do hi s own will , bu t the will of hi s Father, the one who sent him. Though th e Son has a will of his own ,
he subordinates it to the will of his Father, for the Father is
"greate r" than he (John 17:24; 4: 34; 20; 26) . In turn , the Spirit or
parakle/os is a separate di vine personal being who is subordinate
to the Son. Thus the Father is viewed as the gene rator and sender,
as the source or fonl of divinity of the Son and the Spirit. Th e
latter two may be fully divine persons, but they are derivatively so
in dependence on the Fathe r.
Yel the very subordination of wills that distingui shes the di vine
persons also unites them as one on a new level o f ex istence. Th e
Son does the will or the Father. The Spirit docs th e will of the Father and the Son. Though the wills of the Son and the Spirit are
di stinct from the Father's will- they could free ly refu se to do hi s

pros

58 Raymond E. Brown, The Goxpel Aaordilll;: 10 Jvlm I- X II , 2 vols
(Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), 1:24-25. comments:
The Prologue's "the Word was God" offers a difficulty because
there is no artiele before IheflS. Does this imply that ·God· mea ns les.<:
when predicated of the Word than it docs when u!>Cd a~ a name for the
Father? Once agnin the reader must divest himself of a post-Nieene understanding of the vocabula ry invo lved.
The Nlew l T[estament] docs not predic~ te ·'God" of Jesus with any
frequency .... T he reluctance to npply this des igMtion \0 Jesus is
underst:mdablc as part of the NT heritage from Judnism. For the Jews
"God'· meant the heavenly r~ther: and unti l a wider understanding of the
In
term was reached. it could no t be readily applied to J esus.
{John I: I J the Johann ine hym n is bordering on the usage of ·'god'· for
the Son, but by omitting the article it avoids any suggestion of personal identification of the Word with the Father. And for Gentile readers the line also avoids any suggestiun thn t the Word was a second God
in nny Hellenistic sense.
There is further considcrntio n.. .. 1P]erh:'lps there is justine:!lion for seeing in the use of the an:uhorous litem· something more
humb le than the use of ho Ihl;'oS for the Fmher. It is Jesus Christ who
says in John xiv 28. "T he Fother is greater th;1II I:' nod who in X\'ii 3
spcnks of Ihe Father ns ·'the only true God.-· The recog nition of:'l humble position for Jesus Christ in rclmion \0 the f':!thcr is nut SIr:!nge for
earl y Christian hymns. for Philippions ii 6-7 spe~ks of Jesus as emptying himself and not clinging to the form of God.
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will- nevertheless, the Father's will is done because they love him
so completely. II is only because this distinction of wills exists that
Jesus cou ld say: "Not my will, but thine be done."
The Father, Son, and Spirit are primordially united-a claim
made in the gospel of John by use of the Greek words ell and hen,
i.e., ifl and one. The Father is said to be "in" the Son and the Son
"in" the Father, and the Spirit is "in" them both and they" in "
the Spirit. Bccallse of this "i n-ness," or indwelling one-ness and
loving unity, they act as one God. Indeed, if it were proper to
identify an "essence" of God, that essence would not be the Platonic absolutes iden tified by Beckwith and Parrish; rather, that essence is love. God is love. That is the scriptural view-not the
Neoplatoni sm assumed by Beckwith and Parrish.
Now for the astounding part. Mortals have been invited
"in lo" this divine unit y to be one just as the Father and Son arc
one: "nei ther pray I for these alone. but for them also which shall
bel ieve on me through their word; That they all may be one; as
thou, Father. art in me, and I in thee, that th ey also may be one in
us" (John 17:20-21). When mortals enter this relationship of divine unity, the scriptures arc fairl y clear that humans who arc so
united will share the same glory as the divine persons. As the Seventh Lecture on Failh succ inctl y put it:
The Lord said unto Moses, Leviticus xix. 2:
"S peak unto all the co ngregation of the children of
Israel, and say unto them. 'Ye shall be holy: for I the
·Lord your God am holy.'" And Peter says, first epi stle,
i. 15, 16: 'But as he which hath called you is holy, so
be ye holy in all manner of conversation; because it is
written, 'Be ye holy; for I am holy.'" And the Savior
says, Matthew v. 48: 'Be ye therefore perfect, even as
your Father which is in heaven is perfect.' If any
should ask, why all these sayi ngs? the answer is 10 be
fou nd from what is before quoted from John 's epistle,
that when he (the Lord) shall appear, the saints will be
like him; ... for no being can enjoy his glory without
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possessing hi s perfections and holiness, no more than
they CQuld re ign in his ki ngdom without hi s power. 59

The Lectu res concluded that if persons were invited to be one
as the Father and Son arc one, then they also share in the same
glory enjoyed by the Father and the Son: "T hese teachings of th e
Savior most clearly show unto us the nature of salvation, and what
he proposed unto the human fam il y when he proposed to save

the m- that he proposed to make them like unlo himself, and he
was like the Fath er."60 The notion that persons can become like
God is ex pressly stated in the scriptures ( I Joh n 3:2). However, we
must be careful to poin t out that human s can become "go d s"
on ly in a subordinate sense. The source or font of all glory and
divinity is the Fat her. This glory is communicated to humans
through the mediator. The rcvealer of th is glory and the source of
sanctificat ion to become holy as the Fat her is holy is the Spirit. 61
Thu s it must be concluded that, biblically and historica lly,
Mormons are justified in referring to a plural ity of gods ill the
sense that there are distinct divine persons. They are also justified
in conclud ing that the Bible teaches that persons can become like
the Father and the Son in a very strong sense. The divine "likeness and image" can be communicated to perso ns by entering
into a relationship of indwe lling love and divine uni ty. III this
sense, Mormon s affirm a plura lity of gods or of divine pe rso ns.
The very notion was derived legit imately from the biblica l record.
Mormon s arc al so justified hi storically and biblically in asserting that there is only one God . First, God is used as the pec uliar designator of the Father throughout the New Testamenl (d.
t Cori nthian s 8:6). The re is only one source of divinity , only o ne
Father, on ly onc God ill that sense of God. Second , if God refers
to some divine essence, to so me sct of propert ies necessary to be
divine. then there is only one God or di vine essence in that se nse.
59 Lect ure on Faith VII , 10. in N. O. LundwJ. lI . comp., DiSCO/lrses Oil ill/'
Holy Ghost; a/so. Lec/ures 011 Faitlr (Salt Lakc City: BOOKcrart. 1959). 149.
60 Ibid .. VII. 16, in ibid., lSI.
61 The notion that hu mans would be divinizcd was well cst:1blishcd also in
Patrist ic thought. See Keith Norman, " Di vinization : The Forgonen Teaching of
Earl y Christianity," Srm.ttollc (Winter 197.'i): 14- 19: hroslav Pelikan. Tlu'
ChriS/ian Tradilioll: A fl i.rlOry of Deve/opm('1II 0/ DoclrilU' (Chicago: Univcrsity
of Chicago Press, 1971). 155. 206 . 216. 233- 34. 25t). 265-M. 344--45.
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There is only one theores, divinitas, or deitas, or one generic divinity or Godhead or Godhood in that sense (see Acts 17:29). If
God is referred to in this sense then it mu st be used as a predicate
adjective rather than a predicate nominative as Beckwith and
Parrish use it. That is, the generic divine essence is a sct of greatmaking properties severally necessary and jointly sufficient for
their possessor to possess divinity. Each of the Father, Son and
Hol y Ghost has this essence, though none is simply identical with
thi s essence as Beckwith and Parrish' s usage requires. Further, the
New Testament teaches that persons can share in this essence or
become like God (1 John 3:2). Finally, there is only one God in
the sense thaI there is only one divine unity of persons or "Social
Trinity." There is only one di vine family or community of divine
persons in an indwelling relation ship of perfect love. All of these
senses are th orough ly bibli ca l.
Beckwith and Parrish have played fast and loose with both
biblical and Mormon ideas of unity and plurality of God(s). Their
own view appears to be thoroughly incoherent unless they believe
that the Father and the Son are somehow identical. But that view is
certainly not biblical.

10. God's Material Body
Finally, the authors argue that Mormons are wrong to view
God as corporea l or embodied (pp. 114- 16). However, one of the
sc riptures they cite to prove their point is very interesting:
"Behold Illy hal/ds and my feet, that it is 1 myself: handle me and
see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye .~ee me have"
(Luke 24:39). The authors shou ld have asked themselves who was
telling his disciples that he is no mere spirit. It is the resurrec ted
Christ- the very e mbodied being whom Thomas called: " M Y
Lord and my God! " (John 20:28). It seems to me that this sc ripture supports the view that God is embodied- it certainly does nol
support the authors ' argument that God is incorporeal. This is the
rcason Mormons believe that God possesses a glorified body. The
Son, who is the perfect image of the Father, was resurrected and
ascended bodily into heaven (Acts 1:9- [ I). That Christ retained
his resu rrected body is indicated in the expectation that he will
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return " in the same manner"

that he " was taken li p f rom y ou

in to heaven,"
The a u t h o r~ correctly argue that Mormons cannot cite O ld
Testament passages referring 10 God 's bod y to support the view
that Yahweh possessed a glorified bod y (pp. 11 5- 16). They argue
that God is also said to take on the "form" of a dove, or to be a
rock. Yet if these scriptures were take n literally in the way
Mormons read refe rences to God 's body. the n we wou ld have a
strange God (p . 11 6).
However, the amhors too hastil y conclude that there fore G od
is " by natu re [merely} spirit" (p. 116), T hese passages legit imate ly show that Israelites believed that God 's spirit has bodil y
form. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that spirit is some·
ho w contrary to material states.
What disti nguishes references to the hu man fo rm of God f ro m
those co mparing God to a rock or a mi ghty fortress is the co nsistency with which God reveals himsel f in human fo rm. In a ve ry
se nsitive di scussion of ;'God in Human Form ," Tere nce Fretheim
rev iews the appearances of God in visio n in the Old Testame nt and
fin ds it stri king that God always appears in hu man form. 62 " Th e
fact that the human fo rm is constant throug hout Ihe literature
g ive s it a level of sign ifi cance be yond th at of other emp irica l
pheno mena. It may be said that the human form says so meth ing
not on ly about God , but also about the relat ionship between G o d
and wo rld/ peop le : '63 Frethe im nOles that it is a mi stake to ass ume
a discontin uity betwee n spirit and materiali ty in Hebrew thoug ht :

Is the human form one which God assumes for t he
sake of appearance; or is there an essential cont inu ity
between the form and God as God is, or both? It would
62 In Exodus 24: 10. God ap pears ~nd un der his/eel there is a work o f snp·
phire. God ate and drn nk with Israel- implyi ng a physical body; Amos 7:7 and
9: 1 speak of God stand ing: Isaiah 6: I says that Isaiah saw God silling on a
thronc: Jerem iah 1:9 affi rms that God "put forth his hand and touched [hisl
mouth"; in RSV Eze kiel! :26, Ezekiel sees God scaLed :!ho lle the " li keness of:1
throne, ... a like ness as it we re in hum:!n form": RSV Numbers 12:8 tells of
speak ing "mouth to mouth" and ofHthe form of the Lo rd"; RSV Exodus 33:21-23
refers to the ·'plnce by" God, and to God's hand and back. Ac ts 7:56 rcrers to
Stephe n's lIision of Christ "standing on the right hand of God."
63 Fret he im , Tire Srljferilrg o/God, 101.
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be a mistake to move to a consideration of God as spirit
in thi s connect ion. It is remarkable how seldom the OT,
and cvcn the NT, uses !:iuch lan guage to speak of
God .... The spiritual and the phY!iicallmaterial are not
mutually excl usive categories. To speak of God as
spirit does not necessaril y entail formlessness. 64

Thu s Fretheim warns against the very assumption made by
Bec kwith and Parri sh- i.e., that if God is spirit, then he cannot
also have a material form. Yet Fretheim concludes that spirit is not
exclusive from the physical/material in the Bible . Thus it is co nsistent to say that God, in rhe sense alan individual person, has" a
body of spirit" (e.g., Ether 3: 16). Indeed, David Paulsen has
de monstrated that "sp irit" was considered to be a species of material slates in late anliquily.65 Fret heim thus conc ludes:
While final clarity cannot be achieved on this point
on the basis of the ev ide nce we have, it is probable that
Israel did not conce ive of God in terms of formle ssness,
but rather that the human form of the divine appearances constituted an enneshment which bore essemial
con tinuities with the form which God was believed to
have. 66
recommend Fretheirn' s study to all rcaders-cspecially because
his conclusions are di rectly con trary to the clai ms made by

Beckwith and Parri sh.
The fact that Israelites believed God had a human form is
quite clearty set forth in Genesis I :26: "God said 'Let us make
man in ou r image (demur); after our likeness (tse/em).'" That this
image and likeness refers to a genet ic resembl ance is made clear
by Genesis 5:1, 3: "And Adam ... begat a son in hi s own likeness
(r.~elem), after his image (demur), and called hi s name Seth."
However, it mu st be clarifi ed that while God may have a
bodily form, the individual di vine persons are not essentiall y or
64
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65 D::tvid
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necessarily corporeal in Mormo n though t in (lie sense of
"glorified. resurrected bodies." For Yahweh was already fully
God prior to mortal embodimem and resurrect ion. Further, the
personage of the Holy Spirit is d iv ine thoug h as yet not e mbodied. Further. if "God" is used in the sense of the Godhead, then
God in this sense does not possess a body in huma n form. However, if "God" refers to the Father or the Son, then the bibli cal
record fully supports the Mormon view th at God has a human
bodi ly form---or morc accurately, humans have bodies made after
God's image. God is not anthropomorphic; rather. persons a re
theomorphi c. 67

Conclusion
Surely Beckwith and Parri sh are correct thai the Mormon concept of God differs sign ificantl y from traditional views. However,
th eir arguments to show that the Mormo n view is inconsisten t.
logica ll y unacceptable. and unbib lical are serio usly flawed. Nevertheless. they have made a serious attempt to understand and articu late Mormon doctrines. Thei r arguments are not based on
mere caricatures of Mormoni sm as is so common in anti-Mormon
litcrature generally. They have attempted to fa irly assess Mormo n
views and to elucidate phil osophica [ objections from the evangelistic perspecti ve.
Un fortunately, they have not been careful when dealing with
canons and criteria of sound ph ilosophica l argumentation. They
play fast and loose with bibl ical views. Indeed. thei r myop ic
scriptural fundame ntali sm leads them to seriolls e rro rs in scriptural exegesis.
It is certainly time to assess and defi ne Mormon thought with
logica[ rigor. Perhaps their effort will force Mormons to be careful in the articulation of thei r own doctrines. However, I believe
that Beckwith and Parri sh's boo k will mere ly furth er confuse the
issues until a more able analysis comes a[ong- I ho pe someti me
in the near fu ture.
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